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PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES
Solon Barocas* & Karen Levy**
Abstract: This Article offers a comprehensive survey of privacy dependencies—the
many ways that our privacy depends on the decisions and disclosures of other people. What
we do and what we say can reveal as much about others as it does about ourselves, even
when we don’t realize it or when we think we’re sharing information about ourselves alone.
We identify three bases upon which our privacy can depend: our social ties, our similarities
to others, and our differences from others. In a tie-based dependency, an observer learns
about one person by virtue of her social relationships with others—family, friends, or other
associates. In a similarity-based dependency, inferences about our unrevealed attributes are
drawn from our similarities to others for whom that attribute is known. And in differencebased dependencies, revelations about ourselves demonstrate how we are different from
others—by showing, for example, how we “break the mold” of normal behavior or
establishing how we rank relative to others with respect to some desirable attribute. We
elaborate how these dependencies operate, isolating the relevant mechanisms and providing
concrete examples of each mechanism in practice, the values they implicate, and the legal
and technical interventions that may be brought to bear on them. Our work adds to a growing
chorus demonstrating that privacy is neither an individual choice nor an individual value—
but it is the first to systematically demonstrate how different types of dependencies can raise
very different normative concerns, implicate different areas of law, and create different
challenges for regulation.
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INTRODUCTION

When two people—let’s call them Alice and Bob1—interact, and Alice
learns something about Bob in the process, Bob may place his faith in
Alice that she will not communicate these details to others. Bob’s privacy
depends, in part, on Alice’s behavior: here, her willingness to abstain from
speaking about their interactions. While Bob may rely on various social
mechanisms—personal requests, social sanctions, harms to Alice’s
reputation, etc.—to ensure that Alice does not divulge his information to
others, Bob cannot exercise complete control over Alice’s behaviors. And
perhaps he should not be able to; allowing Bob such a right suggests that
Alice has no—or perhaps a lesser—claim to those details that emerged in
their interaction. When preferences conflict, it can be practically difficult
to disentangle whether the information “belongs” to Alice or to Bob and
which of them ought to have control over disclosure decisions.2
Such conflicts are common on social media, where, for example, Alice
may post an unflattering photo of Bob that Bob would rather not have
others see.3 When Alice and Bob disagree on whether the photo should
remain online, whose interests should prevail? While social networks like
Facebook have carved out important exceptions for when Bob might
assert a superior privacy claim over the photo,4 the platform does not grant
Bob exclusive rights over any image in which he might appear—instead,
it encourages users like Bob “to get in touch with the person who posted
1. Alice and Bob are “the world’s most famous cryptographic couple.” Since 1978, the fictional
duo has been used as standard placeholders in explanations of cryptographic protocols and other
engineering problems (e.g., “Alice sends a message to Bob,” “Alice and Bob wish to exchange a
private key”). See Quinn DuPont & Alana Cattapan, Alice and Bob: A History of the World’s Most
Famous Couple, CRYPTOCOUPLE (2017), http://cryptocouple.com/Alice%20and%20Bob%20%20DuPont%20and%20Cattapan%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTZ9-22A4].
2. See generally SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF DISCLOSURE (2002)
(describing those entrusted with others’ private information as “co-owners” of that information).
3. See Gergely Biczók & Pern Hui Chia, Interdependent Privacy: Let Me Share Your Data, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 338 (2013)
(describing nonconsensual photo tagging as an example of privacy’s interdependent nature).
4. These include, among other things, non-consensual pornography. See Community Standards:
Sexual Exploitation of Adults, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/safety/s
exual_exploitation_adults [https://perma.cc/7NRR-L7N7].

04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES

6/6/20 1:12 PM

557

this content in order to resolve the issue.”5 Apple similarly relies on its
users to negotiate disparate privacy preferences about whether to submit
voicemail recordings to improve its speech recognition algorithms. If Bob
leaves a voicemail on Alice’s phone, Alice is charged with the decision
about whether to give Apple access to it—but is warned: “Do not submit
recordings if you believe the speaker would be uncomfortable with you
submitting the content to Apple.”6 Google likewise invokes interpersonal
etiquette, imploring the owners of Nest smart devices to disclose the
devices’ presence to guests in their homes.7 By encouraging users to work
out privacy conflicts among themselves, rather than mediating the conflict
through rule or technology, Facebook, Apple, and Google evince the
common hesitation that platforms and policymakers have about involving
themselves too directly in what are seen as interpersonal
information conflicts.8
One might view these situations as a conflict between Bob’s privacy
and Alice’s freedom of speech.9 For our purposes, they highlight a more
fundamental point: to the extent that people do not retreat completely from
5. See
Photos
or
Videos
that
Violate
Your
Privacy,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/imageprivacyrights [https://perma.cc/4F3G-U4A2]. Strahilevitz
describes these situations as “collective privacy” conflicts. LIOR STRAHILEVITZ, THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 217 (Saul Levmore & Martha Nussbaum eds.,
2010); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1171–72 (2009) (describing
photo tagging and un-tagging on Facebook due to individuals’ divergent privacy preferences).
Facebook also throws up its hands with respect to personal information shared through friends’
contact lists, stating that: “People own their address books . . . . We understand that in some cases this
may mean that another person may not be able to control the contact information someone else
uploads about them.” Kashmir Hill, Facebook is Giving Advertisers Access to Your Shadow Contact
Information, GIZMODO (Sep. 26, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-is-giving-advertisers-accessto-your-shadow-co-1828476051
[https://perma.cc/UJB8-2FWA]
(quoting
a
Facebook
spokesperson).
6. See Anthony Bouchard, How to Use Voicemail Transcription on iPhone, IDOWNLOAD BLOG
(Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.idownloadblog.com/2016/09/21/iphone-voicemail-transcription/
[https://perma.cc/F4CL-3EC3] (emphasis added); Peter Skomoroch (@peteskomoroch), TWITTER
(Oct. 10, 2018, 10:30 PM), https://twitter.com/peteskomoroch/status/1050197774430396416
[https://perma.cc/F99M-KYYA] (displaying screenshot of Apple’s instructions).
7. Leo Kelion, Google Chief: I’d Disclose Smart Speakers Before Guests Enter My Home, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50048144 [https://perma.cc/6MXVC38F]. Google’s devices chief continued, however, to suggest that data collection is “probably
something that the products themselves should try to indicate.” Id.
8. See Karen Levy, Relational Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 78 (2013) (“[I]n most cases,
interpersonal privacy intrusions . . . fall outside the realm of legal redress, precisely because the law
is traditionally hesitant to get involved in the minutiae of personal relationships.”); Karen Levy,
Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 692 (2015) (describing law’s hesitation to “rais[e] the
curtain upon domestic privacy” by exposing that which “ought to be left to family government”
(quoting State v. A.B. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 454, 459 (1868))).
9. Asserting that a person should be able to control what another says about their interactions is
what Eugene Volokh has called a “right to stop people from speaking about you.” Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2000).
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society, everyone’s privacy depends on what others do. There is no way
to live in the world without putting yourself at risk that others might make
use of information about you in ways to which you do not consent. This
is as true of someone interacting with close family, friends, and colleagues
as it is of someone walking down a busy city street among strangers. No
one can claim exclusive privilege to the information communicated in
these encounters. In this most basic sense, individuals’ privacy always
depends on others’ discretion.
The ever-present possibility that Alice might betray Bob’s confidence
does not mean that Bob lives in a constant state of anxiety. When the
social tie is a close one, social, reputational, and emotional considerations
can operate to limit Alice’s disclosures about Bob.10 Information sharing
often closely accompanies social connection: pals are commonly
confidants,11 and the fact that Alice and Bob have control over one
another’s private information can facilitate mutual cooperation, trust, and
confidence in their relationship. Bob’s dependency on Alice effectively
communicates to Alice that he trusts her with such details, fostering
intimacy rather than suspicion. Alice may recognize that withholding
information shared in confidence is necessary to maintain Bob’s
confidence in her. And when trading personal information back and forth,
Alice and Bob may knowingly and happily put themselves in a position
of mutual dependency.12
The regulation of Bob’s privacy vis-à-vis Alice’s behavior, under these
conditions, is really a matter of appropriate social conduct, where
violations are met with accusations of betrayal or a questioning of
character.13 Social norms can curb information sharing that implicates

10. Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context in
Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051, 1061 (2014) (“In a networked setting, teens cannot
depend on single-handedly controlling how their information is distributed. What their peers share
about them, and what they do with the information they receive cannot be regulated technically, but
must be negotiated socially.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good,
65 DUKE L.J. 385, 452 (2015) (“Shaming is a social sanction, which is frequently used as a reaction
to informational damage. Spread rumors about a sister-in-law, and expect to be ostracized at family
gatherings. Air dirty laundry on Facebook, and expect to be defriended.”).
11. CYNTHIA FEE, THANK YOU FOR BEING A FRIEND (Asylum Records 1985) (theme song for The
Golden Girls).
12. ARI E. WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 51 (2018).
13. As Nissenbaum has argued, privacy should thus not be understood as a matter of control, but
rather in terms of information flows that abide by context-dependent norms. HELEN NISSENBAUM,
PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009); see also
Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1996)
(discussing the relationship between law and norms in the context of blackmail); Lior J. Strahilevitz,
Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359 (2003); Yu Pu
& Jens Grossklags, Sharing is Caring, Or Callous?, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCE
CRYPTOLOGY AND NETWORK SECURITY 670 (2016) (investigating relationships between the value
people attach to data about their friends and their perceived level of bonding social capital).

04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES

6/6/20 1:12 PM

559

other people’s privacy, even in the absence of law—and can do so in ways
that are recognized as necessary for a well-functioning society.
But privacy norms, however important, are limited prophylactics to
these problems. The situation described above is a simple one: Bob
depends on Alice not to tell others his secret. But our privacy is
determined by others’ choices in many far more complicated situations
than this. This may be because Alice’s disclosure implicating Bob is
involuntary, or because she doesn’t know the effect it will have on Bob;
or because she has no relationship to or knowledge of Bob at all. In fact,
Alice may disclose information that is explicitly and exclusively about
Alice, seemingly having nothing whatsoever to do with Bob, and can still
implicate his privacy in so doing. In these situations, social norms are of
limited utility in protecting Bob’s privacy.
This Article explores the varied ways in which one person’s privacy is
implicated by information others reveal. We term these phenomena
privacy dependencies and we identify three broad types. In a tie-based
dependency, an observer learns about one person by virtue of that person’s
social relationships with others—family, friends, or other associates. This
may occur, for example, when a person subject to surveillance
communicates with others: even those who are not the person of interest
might be “caught in the net” of observation. In a similarity-based
dependency, inferences about our unrevealed attributes are drawn from
our similarities to others for whom that attribute is known. And in
difference-based dependencies, revelations about ourselves demonstrate
how we are different from others—by showing how we “break the mold”
of normal behavior, showing how we rank relatively on some desirable
attribute, or by allowing an observer to pinpoint an unknown person
through process of elimination.
Prior research has explored privacy’s socially interdependent nature in
various ways.14 Research on the social value of privacy underscores the
necessity of privacy to social functioning: individual privacy guarantees
enable collective values to flourish by making space for individuals to live
freely, interact unreservedly, and participate fully in social life. In this
way, social groups enjoy the benefits afforded by individual privacy.15
14. For a survey of work about how different technical research communities have examined
interdependent privacy and a review of methodologies that have been used to study the problem, see
Mathias Humbert et al., A Survey on Interdependent Privacy, 52 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 122
(2019), https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/264048 [https://perma.cc/BC8Y-JAAX].
15. See generally PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1995); BEATE ROESSLER & DOROTA MOKROSINSKA, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (2015); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law,
89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609 (1999); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 760–64 (2007).
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Complementary work on group privacy recognizes privacy interests that
inhere in group membership—both the “right to huddle” in private
association with others16 and a privacy interest in aggregated statistical
attributes of groups to which one belongs.17 Work on relational privacy
recognizes that different privacy expectations attach to different people
and institutions in our lives and suggests that law should take into account
these different sensitivities in setting rules about such expectations (for
example, by recognizing that we may have a greater interest in privacy
against the government than we do against our neighbors).18 Networked
privacy explores the complex and creative practices required to negotiate
information flows in networked spaces (e.g., social media platforms),
thanks in part to others’ roles in sharing information about us.19 Other
work has drawn from economic concepts—exploring, for example, the
idea of privacy externalities, which exist “where one person’s decision to
share information can adversely affect others who choose to remain
silent,”20 and privacy as a public good, which observes that “[a]n
16. See Edward J. Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 219
(1977). Bloustein is often credited with coining the term group privacy, which he suggests is “a form
of privacy that people seek in their associations with others.” Id. at 221. On Bloustein’s account,
group privacy “is an attribute of individuals in association with one another within a group, rather
than an attribute of the group itself[,]” akin to the shared secrecy expected between lovers or in a
football huddle. Id. at 221–23. Bloustein’s concern is about individuals associating themselves with
others, rather than based on shared characteristics among people.
17. LINNET TAYLOR, LUCIANO FLORIDI & BART VAN DER SLOOT, GROUP PRIVACY: NEW
CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES (2017); Anton Vedder, KDD: The Challenge to
Individualism, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 275 (1999). In light of the limitations of the individual privacy
model to address the harms of data mining, Vedder introduces the idea of categorical privacy, which
protects “information . . . [which is] originally taken from the personal sphere of individuals, and—
after aggregation and processing according to statistical methods—is no longer accompanied by
identifiers of individual natural persons, but, instead, by identifiers of groups of persons[.]” Id. at 279.
Taylor et al. discuss two ontologies of group privacy: one attached to groups of individuals (what they
term an entity-first approach, in which group privacy is understood as “a result of the collection of
the privacies of the constituting members”) and one attached to particular attributes (a predicate-first
approach, in which group privacy is “an emergent property, over and above the collection of the
privacies of the constituting members”). TAYLOR ET AL., supra, at 7–8.
18. Karen Levy et al., Regulating Privacy in Public/Private Space: The Case of Nursing Home
Monitoring Laws, 26 ELDER L.J. 323, 327–29 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of
Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249 (2012).
19. Networked privacy conceptualizes privacy as a set of practices to manage and negotiate
boundaries between audiences and contexts in networked information systems. As previously
bounded social contexts blur into one another and disrupt context-specific norms, people struggle to
control what information is shared about them, and by whom. As a result, people develop new
strategies, both individual and collective, to manage their privacy (e.g., steganographic posting,
strategic content curation). See Eszter Hargittai & Alice Marwick, “What Can I Really Do?”
Explaining the Privacy Paradox with Online Apathy, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3737 (2016); Marwick &
Boyd, supra note 10, at 1603; Phillip Fei Wu et al., A Contextual Approach to Information Privacy
Research, 70 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2019).
20. Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 I/S:
J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 428–29 (2011). Our notion of privacy dependencies is somewhat
broader than MacCarthy’s definition of privacy externalities. MacCarthy explicitly excludes from his
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individual who is careless with data exposes not only extensive
information about herself, but about others as well.”21
And for perhaps the first time, interdependence is becoming part of
mainstream public discourse about privacy. This development owes in
large part to recent high-profile situations in which one person’s privacy
has depended on the choices of another—most notably, the Cambridge
Analytica scandal in March 2018 (in which Facebook users unwittingly
revealed information about their friends to a political consulting firm) and
the increasing use of familial DNA search in criminal investigations (in
which suspects are apprehended based on DNA their relatives submitted
to genealogical databases). In the public imagination, these two situations
lay bare the degree to which our most intimate associates—friends and
family—can expose us.22 But our privacy depends on others in far more
situations than these, and in many diverse forms—including contexts in
which informants are more socially distant than friends or family, and
even less likely to be governed by relational norms that might
mediate disclosure.
Scholars have pointed to privacy’s social nature as yet another nail in
the coffin of the individualistic, notice-and-consent model of privacy
regulation, arguing that in addition to the model’s other problems,23 it fails
to provide protection for those whose privacy depends on others but who

analysis “phenomena where one person is directly disclosing information about another person[,]”
focusing instead on cases in which “the data subject reveals information only about himself” that
nonetheless negatively impacts others. Id. at 449. The types of dependencies we describe include
instances of both cases. Economists have also studied the issue using game-theoretic approaches,
demonstrating that information externalities can lead to market disequilibria. See Daron Acemoglu et
al., Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 26296, 2019) (establishing that others’ disclosures will undermine consumers’
ability to command a price for their own data that is in keeping with how much they value their
privacy); Jay Pil Choi et al., Privacy and Personal Data Collection With Information Externalities,
173 J. PUB. ECON. 113 (2019) (demonstrating that externalities lead to disequilibrium even with
informed consent); Mathias Humbert et al., On Non-Cooperative Genomic Privacy, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 407 (2015)
(showing inefficient equilibria in the context of sharing genetic data when family members have
different sharing preferences).
21. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 10, at 385. Our exploration here includes some cases in which an
individual is “careless” with his own data and hence implicates others’ interests, but also cases in
which individuals disclose their own data involuntarily.
22. As an example of such discourse, see Will Oremus, How the Golden State Killer’s DNA Search
is
Like
the
Cambridge
Analytica
Scandal,
SLATE
(May
1,
2018),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/how-the-golden-state-killers-dna-search-is-like-thecambridge-analytica-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/M4BB-W9SP] (“Cambridge Analytica and
GEDmatch are a stark reminder that the problems go deeper than just better informing users of what
they’re giving up about themselves.” (emphasis added)).
23. See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 13; Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy SelfManagement and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013), for a review of the
philosophical and practical grounds for discounting the individual model of privacy regulation.
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receive no opportunity to withhold consent.24 We agree—and claim
further that the particular mechanisms of the dependency pose
meaningfully different threats to privacy and its protection. We survey the
various mechanisms behind these dependencies, placing them into a
framework that highlights how they relate to and differ from one another.
In so doing, we illustrate how different normative values—freedom of
association, social solidarity, nondiscrimination, and others—attach to
these arrangements, and consider how social practices, policies, and
technical interventions respond to them. We pay particular attention to
how different dependencies implicate diverse areas of law.
Part II presents this framework. We consider three different categories
of privacy dependency: dependencies based on a tie between individuals
(section II.A); dependencies based on similarity between them
(section II.B); and dependencies based on differences between them
(section II.C). In Part III, we explore the interaction of our dependency
forms in the context of genetics, as an illustration of how they merge,
conflict, and implicate different values in practice. Part IV concludes with
implications for privacy’s protection.

II.

THREE TYPES OF PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES

First, a comment on notation. We’ll refer throughout to three
characters: Alice, Bob, and the Observer. In our model, Alice is the party
who reveals some sort of information to the Observer—and in all cases,
Alice’s disclosure leads to the Observer learning some information about
Bob. We can say, in each case, that Bob’s privacy is dependent on Alice’s
disclosure or nondisclosure of information. We choose not to personalize
the Observer beyond its instrumental status as the collector of Alice’s
information. The Observer could, in principle, be an individual—but as
we shall see, in most practical cases, it stands in for a corporate or
governmental actor (say, the police or a social media platform).
Across our cases, there is considerable variety about what it is that
Alice shares and why she does so. Alice’s disclosure may include
information that is—on its face—solely about Alice; solely about Bob; or
about the both of them and their relationship to one another. In varying
circumstances, Alice may or may not intend, or even know, that she is
24. See, e.g., MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 447 (arguing against the individual informed consent
model of privacy protection because “[i]ndividual level choices will result in data collection and use
patterns that impose substantial tangible costs on individuals who are not directly involved in making
those choices”). MacCarthy argues, instead, for an “unfairness framework” that weighs the public
benefit of information practices against prospective harms, and incorporates potential privacy
externalities into the calculus. Id. at 430. Fairfield and Engel similarly note the limitations of the
individual model, and argue for using tools and concepts from the behavioral economics literature on
public goods to protect privacy at the group level. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 10, at 388–89; see
also Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice
Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 485 (2015).
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disclosing anything at all to the Observer—or she may be coerced,
incentivized, or required to do so. Alternatively, she may reveal
information wholly upon her own volition, with or without awareness of
the privacy consequences of her actions for Bob.
As a final wrinkle, a privacy dependency may involve one or many
Alices, and one or many Bobs. The Observer may learn something
meaningful about Bob only upon the disclosures of several Alices;
alternatively, a single Alice may reveal something with privacy
consequences for numerous Bobs. And as we shall see, both additional
combinations (an Alice and a Bob, many Alices and many Bobs)
also occur.

A.

Tie

Data about us often reside in those with whom we associate. An
Observer who gathers information about Alice may learn about Bob by
virtue of his connection to Alice. Indeed, by capitalizing on the
relationship between Alice and Bob, an Observer can circumvent
obstacles to learning about Bob directly—and can often make better sense
of the information obtained about Alice. Observers commonly leverage
our interpersonal connections to collect information about individuals via
their associates (a dynamic we call passthrough); incidentally observe one
person in the course of observing another (bycatch); identify unknown
people based on their relationships with known others (identification); and
justify the collection of data about the people with whom individuals are
connected (tie-justified observation).

1.

Passthrough

In some cases, Alice may serve as a conduit through which Bob’s
information is passed to the Observer. As mentioned above, Bob may
have previously shared some bit of personal information with Alice,
which Alice subsequently passes along. Alice may share Bob’s
information knowingly, perhaps upon having been coerced or
incentivized to do so. The practice of acting as a confidential informant is
a classic example: because law enforcement cannot observe Bob directly,
it leverages Alice’s social tie to Bob to gather intelligence about Bob. The
Observer may provide Alice with some sort of favorable treatment in
exchange for providing information about Bob—or may exploit existing
weaknesses in Alice and Bob’s relationship.25
25. See Spencer Headworth, Getting to Know You: Welfare Fraud Investigation and the Appropriation
of Social Ties, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 181 (2019) (noting that people may be motivated to report associates’
welfare fraud as “an instrument for personal agendas or a weapon in interpersonal conflicts”).
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But Alice may also serve as a passthrough for Bob’s data in much more
commonplace situations, and even without her knowledge. An Observer
may, for instance, trick Alice into providing information about one or
many Bobs to whom she is connected. A prominent example is social
networks’ practice of encouraging users to upload contact lists in order to
find friends who already use the service—and to solicit participation by
those who don’t, while building “shadow” profiles of these non-users.26 If
enough of Bob’s friends and associates have uploaded their contact lists,
the social network will know Bob’s precise position in the social graph,
despite his steadfast refusal to join the network. Prompting users to share
their contact lists is one of the most common “dark patterns”27 on the web:
platforms and messaging apps often mislead users into doing so through
sneaky design tactics or promises of a better user experience on the site.28
Less intuitively, privacy dependencies can also result when the
Observer acts as a passthrough; that is, when Bob seeks to share some
information with Alice but can only do so by first passing it to the
Observer. These situations, increasingly common as personal
communications are mediated by platforms, practically require Bob to
knowingly reveal information about himself to an Observer—because
doing so is the only practical way he can communicate with Alice. Bob
may find himself under increasing pressure to reveal information about
himself as a larger share of his associates begin to communicate through
intermediaries with centralized architectures (i.e., when all the
connections between nodes pass through a centralized hub). Common
26. Daniel K. Gillmor, Facebook is Tracking Me Even Though I’m Not on Facebook, ACLU: FREE
FUTURE BLOG (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internetprivacy/facebook-tracking-me-even-though-im-not-facebook
[https://perma.cc/VER3-HHBV]
(“Facebook uses . . . contact information to learn about people, even if those people don’t agree to
participate. It also links people together based on who they know, even if the shared contact hasn’t
agreed to this use. For example, I received an email from Facebook that lists the people who have all
invited me to join Facebook: my aunt, an old co-worker, a friend from elementary school,
etc. . . . Facebook records this group of people as my contacts, even though I’ve never agreed to this
kind of data collection.”); see also Iraklis Symeonidis et al., Collateral Damage of Facebook ThirdParty Applications: A Comprehensive Study, 77 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 179 (2018) (discussing the
prevalence of “collateral information collection”—that is, information about a user’s friends—across
Facebook apps).
27. Friend Spam, DARK PATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern/friend-spam
[https://perma.cc/ZGT7-BXHD].
28. In 2015, LinkedIn settled a lawsuit for $13 million for harvesting contacts from users through
such tactics and then spamming those contacts with invitations, seemingly sent by the user, to join
the service. John Brownlee, After Lawsuit Settlement, LinkedIn’s Dishonest Design is Now a $13
Million Problem, FASTCO DESIGN (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.fastcodesign.com/3051906/afterlawsuit-settlement-linkedins-dishonest-design-is-now-a-13-million-problem
[https://perma.cc/VH5W-U37K]. And WhatsApp came under fire from Canadian and Dutch privacy
regulators for auto-populating users’ contact lists from their phone address books, and for retaining
this contact information on their own servers. Chester Wisniewski, WhatsApp’s Privacy Investigated
by
Joint
Canadian-Dutch
Probe,
NAKED
SECURITY
(Jan.
29,
2013),
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/01/29/whatsapps-privacy-investigated-by-joint-canadiandutch-probe [https://perma.cc/6R6W-NVSX].
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communication infrastructures ranging from telephones to online social
networks enjoy so-called “network effects”: as a greater number of Bob’s
associates participate, Bob stands to benefit more from participating as
well.29 Alice and others’ decisions to join (and hence share information
with) Facebook, for example, may create powerful incentives for Bob to
join, especially if Bob would miss out on valued social interactions should
he abstain. Their decisions do not compromise Bob’s privacy directly;
instead, their choices make Bob’s refusal to share information more
costly. Bob may find that reaching his associates is less convenient, more
expensive, or outright impossible if he does not join the platform.30 In
other words, he might feel compelled to participate by the choices that
Alice and others have made.
Network effects can make leaving a platform difficult as well.31 Alice
and Bob—along with all of their associates—may decide that they no
longer want to share their information with Facebook as a condition of
communicating with each other, but they cannot replicate the value that
Facebook offers unless they all move, collectively, to another platform.
Network effects often create a type of collective action problem because
no one wants to be the first person to leave the network. At the same time,
individual actors may find it difficult to coordinate a wholesale move. Bob
may hesitate to leave unless he knows that he’ll be able to find Alice
elsewhere; he’d likely have even less confidence in his ability to persuade
all of his other associates to make the move with him. Once Alice, Bob,
and their associates have made the decision to join a network, none of
them may be in a position to orchestrate their effective individual or
collective departure.
Data portability and interoperability between platforms are often cited
as possible solutions to this problem—but their success in practice has

29. See generally DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS:
REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 509–42 (2010). Network effects can be either
general (in which only the number of additional adopters provides the benefit) or identity-specific
(when who adopts matters—for example, high-status users, or one’s particular group of friends). In
other words, network effects may incentivize Bob’s participation on a data-gathering platform either
because many Alices choose to adopt (general) or because particular Alices of social import to Bob
adopt (identity-specific). See Paul DiMaggio & Joseph Cohen, Information Inequality and Network
Externalities: A Comparative Study of the Diffusion of Television and the Internet, in THE ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 235–36 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2004).
30. Various studies have attempted to specify the social and economic costs of opt-out from social
networks. See, e.g., GREG NORCIE & L. JEAN CAMP, THE PRICE OF PRIVACY: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ABSTENTION FROM SOCIAL NETWORKS
2–3 (2015),
http://www.ljean.com/files/abstain.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ5T-QYUV] (explaining how abstention
from social network sites may impede access to career opportunities).
31. Eric P.S. Baumer et al., Limiting, Leaving, and (re)Lapsing: An Exploration of Facebook NonUse Practices and Experiences, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS
IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3257, 3257 (2013).
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been limited.32 At best, data portability would allow Alice and Bob to find
a different Observer to mediate their communication. And even when
standards are interoperable, Alice and Bob will have to reveal information
to each other’s service providers. Consider what happens if Alice uses
Gmail: Bob can only reach her by email if he sends his message to
Google’s email servers (even if Bob is not himself a Gmail user). In other
words, Alice’s decision to use Gmail requires Bob to disclose information
to Google as a condition of communicating with her.33
The law has occasionally taken pains to preserve the sanctity of social
ties, but in other respects, it has created structures that enable the easy
exploitation of ties for the procurement of information. As we have noted,
the law is loath to regulate passthrough-based disclosures in many cases,
generally preferring that social norms be relied upon to govern
disagreements. For certain social ties—between attorney and client,
doctor and patient, priest and penitent—the law does take steps to insulate
Bob from having his information passed through Alice, in the interest of
maintaining the sanctity and confidence of those socially important
relations.34 The law acknowledges that society benefits when people are
able to place themselves in positions of extreme vulnerability vis-à-vis
one another, and weighs that benefit over access to those confidences for
evidentiary purposes.35 In some cases, the protection afforded to
privileged communications is so strong that it cannot be waived even if
one party wishes to testify against another.36 Despite this, in other cases,
32. Arvind Narayanan et al., A Critical Look at Decentralized Personal Data Architectures, DATA
USAGE
MGMT.
ON
WEB
1
(2012),
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2012/WWWDUMW/papers/dumw2012_submission_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4EK-NRPK].
33. For example, Matera v. Google centered on Google’s automated scanning of non-Gmail-users’
messages when they sent email to a Gmail account. Google scanned the messages in order to target
ads to users. Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2017 WL 1365021 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15,
2017). Here, Google had access to the nonusers’ messages by virtue of their communication with
Gmail users. Id. at *2. The case eventually settled when Google agreed to stop scanning these
messages for advertising purposes; however, Google still scans nonusers’ emails for spam and
malware detection and to generate Smart Replies. Brian Fung, Gmail Will No Longer Snoop on Your
Emails
for
Advertising
Purposes,
WASH.
POST
(June
26,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/26/gmail-will-no-longer-snoop-onyour-emails-for-advertising-purposes/ [https://perma.cc/56WT-LTNP].
34. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223
(1839) (preventing a wife’s testimony against her husband in order to protect “the enjoyment of that
confidence which should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and dearest relations
of life. To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife,
would be to destroy the best solace of human existence”).
35. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77
(1958) (“The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against
wife . . . was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit
of [the family], but for the benefit of the public as well.”).
36. The privilege for confidential communications in marriage has been so treated. See, e.g., United
States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Colo. 1982) (barring a wife who desired to testify as to
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the law sometimes exploits passthrough-based disclosures. The thirdparty doctrine—which holds that individuals have no constitutional
expectation of privacy in information they have voluntarily given to
another—was originally justified by the premise that being “betrayed by
an informer . . . [is] inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the
kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”37 But many legal
scholars have opined that the doctrine makes less sense given the ubiquity
of platform-mediated communication, in which we have virtually no
choice but to pass information through Observers (who may then,
voluntarily or compulsorily, share that information with the
government).38

2.

Bycatch

In commercial fishing, bycatch refers to those species caught
unintentionally that are not the species being targeted—dolphins in tuna
nets, seabirds, undersized fish, and the like.39 Though fisheries can take
steps to try to reduce bycatch, contemporary fishing technology makes
some degree of incidental bycatch unavoidable. While in some cases, nontarget species can be returned to the ocean unharmed, many others perish
in the course of being captured or are subsequently discarded.40 Data
collection bears similarity to commercial fishing: Bob may be “caught in
the net” when Alice’s data are targeted for collection.
This collection may be foreseeable but incidental: Bob may be a
bystander in a photograph taken of Alice, in which the photographer has
no real intent to capture Bob’s image.41 This concern has come to the fore
recently in debates over the risks and benefits of police body-worn
cameras, and whether the public should have access to the footage they
capture—which may contain substantial personal information about crime
victims, witnesses, and bystanders in addition to that of officers and
defendants. Jurisdictions that require body-worn cameras have attempted

marital communications with her husband from doing so, in the interest of preventing the government
from “invad[ing] the confidences of marriage to turn those nearest and dearest into informers”).
37. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting
that the third-party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”).
39. Martin A. Hall, On Bycatches, 6 REVS. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 319, 321 (1996).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Roberto Hoyle et al., Privacy Behaviors of Lifeloggers Using Wearable Cameras, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 ACM INT’L JOINT CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE & UBIQUITOUS
COMPUTING 571, 572 (2014) (investigating how bystanders respond to the presence of lifelogging
devices and the willingness of lifeloggers to respect the privacy of bystanders).
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to strike a balance between releasing data relevant to “target” individuals
and protecting the privacy of others in the frame of such video, commonly
through redaction and restrictions on public access.42
Bycatch can also occur when Alice and Bob share physical space.
Perhaps Bob is a short-term guest in Alice’s home, which Alice has
equipped with smart devices that capture video, audio, or other types of
data (say, an Amazon Echo or a Nest Cam).43 Bob’s data may be captured,
processed, and transmitted alongside Alice’s back to the vendor of the
device, very likely without Bob’s knowledge or consent—but also,
perhaps, without the Observer’s specific intent to capture data about Bob.
Of course, sometimes Alice intends for the Observer to see Bob in the
footage. Alice might want a home security camera to transmit Bob’s
doings in Alice’s home to the company that provides the equipment—or
on to the police. Amazon’s Ring video doorbells, for example, transmit
recordings back to the company for storage and processing.44 Notably,
Ring includes a companion app called Neighbors that allows users to
share information collected from their device with others in the
neighborhood, specifically via Amazon,45 and Amazon may, in turn, pass
this information on to the police.46
Or perhaps the Observer takes a photo of Alice, knowing that it will
capture Bob in the background. The Observer might enlist Alice’s help in
snapping a less conspicuous picture of Bob by making it appear that the
Observer is only interested in Alice. People routinely employ this tactic
when trying to photograph celebrities without their express consent or
notice—a kind of reverse photobombing.47
Given these risks, we might expect the Observer to take special steps
to alert Bob to the possibility that his information might be swept up with
Alice’s. For example, vendors may design devices in such a way that
makes Alice’s choice to install or use the devices highly conspicuous to

42. See Bryce C. Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study of Police Body Camera
Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J. 1329 (2017); Mary D.
Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016).
43. Eric Zeng, Shrirang Mare & Franziska Roesner, End User Security and Privacy Concerns with Smart
Homes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 65 (2017).
44. Ring Smart Doorbell
[https://perma.cc/3EJV-5JMN].

Cameras,

RING,

https://shop.ring.com/pages/doorbell-cameras

45. Neighbors by Ring, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/neighbors [https://perma.cc/H9UP-CS6X].
46. Kate Cox, It’s the User’s Fault if a Ring Camera Violates Your Privacy, Amazon Says,
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/11/cops-can-keep-ringfootage-forever-share-it-with-anyone-amazon-confirms [https://perma.cc/N6V8-N9FS].
47. Gordon Fletcher & Anita Greenhill, Photobombing: Mobility, Humour and Culture, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNICATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 198–206 (2010).
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Bob.48 A bright red light may draw Bob’s attention to the device, alerting
him to the fact that he is being recorded. In other cases, the burden might
be placed on Alice to make sure that the implications of her choices are
apparent to Bob. Ring, for example, “includes a door/window sticker in
the box with each device that is equipped with audiovisual recording
capabilities,” enjoining—but not requiring—customers to use these
visuals to alert people who might be captured by the device.49 Likewise,
the decision to install a smart device in a multi-occupant home may rest
with one resident—Alice—even when it implicates others’ privacy. In
practice, Bob rarely has any say in Alice’s decision.50
In some special cases, the law has viewed each occupant as having an
important claim to preserving the privacy of a shared space. In nursing
homes, for example, family members often want to be able to monitor
their loved ones remotely, via webcam—even when residents share
rooms. State statutes that address nursing home monitoring require that a
resident’s roommates consent to monitoring, often allowing them to place
limits on its use (e.g., restricting the times of day a camera is on) or to
switch rooms if they do not consent.51 In this case, Alice’s relatives’
interests are not allowed to trump Bob’s privacy concern.52
Others have proposed alternative legal approaches to protect
“secondary users.”53 For example, companies could be required to
distinguish between the data of primary users (who ostensibly consented
to data collection) and secondary users whose data were collected
incidentally. Secondary user data might be subject to shorter data
retention periods; the sale of data to third parties that includes secondary

48. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027 (2012) (proposing means of providing visceral notice of privacy-invasive technologies).
49. Letter from Amazon to Sen. Edward Markey (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.markey.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Response%20Letter_Ring_Senator%20Markey%2011.01.2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C2JY-VQE7].
50. See Christine Geeng & Franziska Roesner, Who’s In Control? Interactions in Multi-User Smart
Homes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 268 (2019) (“[R]oommates resolve conflicts by deferring to the default control and agency
of the device’s installer or owner, a recurring theme in our findings.”).
51. Lipton, supra note 53, at 422–24.
52. Levy et al., supra note 18, at 352–55. In practice, however, these laws may not be effective
means of protecting roommates’ privacy, as they often depend on frequent adjustments that may not
be realistic to enact in understaffed nursing homes. Id. at 354–55.
53. Alex B. Lipton, Privacy Protections for Secondary Users of Communication-Capturing
Technologies, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 396 (2016) (discussing inefficacy of current privacy regimes for
protecting the interests of secondary users). See generally Mariella Dimiccoli et al., Mitigating
Bystander Privacy Concerns in Egocentric Activity Recognition with Deep Learning and Intentional
Image Degradation, 1 PROC. ACM ON INTERACTIVE, MOBILE, WEARABLE & UBIQUITOUS TECHS.
(2018) (proposing technical means of blurring bystanders’ faces in photos). See also Meg L. Jones,
Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639 (2014).
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users might be prohibited; and secondary users’ data might be
anonymized using various technical methods.
But for the most part, the law does not vest Bob with privacy
protections when he is caught up in the net of Alice’s data. Fourth
Amendment standing doctrine maintains that a defendant may only
challenge a search when one’s own person or property are searched, under
the justification that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
person or property of another person.54 Bob has no recourse, then, against
a warrantless search of Alice’s car that happens to reveal incriminating
evidence about Bob—regardless of whether Alice’s own privacy rights
were violated in the course of the search.55 The same logic has been
applied to “incidental overhear” of electronic communications with
targets of lawful surveillance. In United States v. Hasbajrami,56 the
Second Circuit held that a U.S. resident had no Fourth Amendment
interest in his emails with a foreign person targeted under section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, despite the fact that such
collection would foreseeably capture the communications of people other
than the target.57
Ironically, respecting Bob’s privacy when he appears alongside Alice
may require that Alice make herself uniquely identifiable: to ensure that
no one but Alice’s data are captured, an Observer may use biometric tools
(like face or voice recognition) to distinguish Alice from anyone else. But
doing so creates a “privacy-privacy tradeoff” in which Alice must render
more information about herself for Bob’s privacy to be protected.58

3.

Identification

We can also identify an unknown Bob by virtue of his connection to a
known Alice. In familial search procedures, unidentified DNA evidence
54. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
55. Id.
56. 945 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 2019).
57. Id. at 662–64. In the foreign surveillance context, data minimization requirements are intended
to “to some degree compensate for the possibility of broad incidental collection.” PRIVACY & CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 116 (July 2, 2014),
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC6N-LLBY].
Indeed,
in
Hasbajrami, while the court found that Hasbajrami had no Fourth Amendment interest in the
incidental collection of his emails, it left open the question of whether querying a database of
incidentally collected communications violated Hasbajrami’s privacy interests. Id. at 646.
58. David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 229 (2016) (discussing
cases in which privacy in one respect is traded off against privacy in another—including cases in
which “privacy burdens or benefits [shift] from one group . . . to another”). Privacy-privacy tradeoffs are their own kind of dependency, in which Alice must be willing to sacrifice her own privacy to
maintain Bob’s. In addition to trading off against Alice’s privacy, incentivizing companies to develop
better biometric recognition tools may impose additional net costs on consumers and their privacy.
See Lipton, supra note 53, at 423.
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from a crime scene is compared to identified DNA samples in order to
assess whether a person genetically related to (i.e., a family member of)
someone of known identity is likely to have committed the crime in
question.59 Here, genetic ties are the basis for dependency: Bob’s
identification by law enforcement rests on Alice’s (voluntary or
involuntary) provision of her own DNA. In some cases, Alice’s DNA is
collected strategically in order to confirm suspicion of a particular Bob.
The “BTK” serial murderer, Dennis Rader, was identified based on a
match between crime scene evidence and his daughter’s DNA, collected
without her knowledge by police from a Pap smear she had at a state
university hospital five years earlier;60 police already suspected Rader of
the murders based on other evidence, and his daughter’s DNA sample
confirmed their suspicions.61 And an arrest recently made in the long-cold
case of the Golden State Killer, who raped and murdered numerous
victims in California between 1976 and 1986, was based in large part on
comparing unidentified crime-scene DNA to a sample submitted to a
genealogy website.62
Increasingly, DNA samples from crime scenes are run “blind” against
large databases of samples from those convicted or arrested without

59. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L.R. 291
(2010); see also Danah Boyd & Karen Levy, Networked Rights and Networked Harms (working
paper, Mar. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
60. Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, A Tool to Make Arrests, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/20/AR2008042002388.html
[https://perma.cc/6SKC-VLNB].
61. Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2006), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/how_the_cops_caught_btk/ [https://perma.cc/6TU3-FRUL].
62. Sam Stanton, Relative’s DNA from Genealogy Websites Cracked East Area Rapist Case, DA’s
Office Says, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.sacbee.com/latestnews/article209913514.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). Before the arrest, Michelle McNamara, who
investigated the Golden State Killer’s case for years, lamented the fact that genealogy websites had
to date failed to cooperate with law enforcement efforts. Jeva Lange, Michelle McNamara’s
Tantalizing Roadmap for Finding a Long Lost Serial Killer, WEEK (Mar. 19, 2018),
http://theweek.com/articles/761206/michelle-mcnamaras-tantalizing-roadmap-finding-long-lostserial-killer [https://perma.cc/GA2Z-MDNL] (“The most frustrating detail of all is that police have
the Golden State Killer’s DNA, but they can only compare it to DNA in their database of criminals
convicted of felonies—where there are, naturally, no hits. There are other DNA databases in
existence, though: 23andMe has 1.5 million people’s profiles, and Ancestry.com has 2.5 million.
‘Unfortunately,’ write McNamara’s editors, ‘neither company will work with law enforcement, citing
privacy issues and their terms of service.’ Yet ‘[i]f we could just submit the killer’s actual genetic
material . . . to one of these databases, the odds are great that we would find a second or third cousin
and that person would lead investigators to the killer’s identity.’”). Those databases have since grown
to about 5 million and 10 million profiles, respectively. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden
State Killer is Tracked Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html
[https://perma.cc/E9DG-FR8Y].
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conviction,63 without particularized suspicion as to the suspect’s identity.
Here, establishing a relationship between a crime-scene sample and a
known Alice in the database serves as an investigative tool to locate likely
perpetrators.64 In each case, the genetic link between Alice and Bob allows
an Observer (here, the state) to identify Bob through Bob’s connection to
Alice—because Bob is unknown to the Observer, or because direct access
to Bob is legally or practically unavailable.
Traditional police work also exploits this possibility all the time,
initiating the search for an unknown suspect by investigating the suspect’s
known associates. Consider the following situation: Alice and Bob appear
in surveillance footage together. The police recognize Alice by sight,
given their prior interactions with her, but they do not recognize Bob,
given his lack of criminal history. Yet simply observing Alice and Bob
together gives the police a clue about Bob’s identity because the police
will exploit their knowledge of Alice to identify Bob—her
apparent associate.
Social networks follow a similar strategy when they try to identify the
people that appear in uploaded photos using facial recognition technology.
Rather than attempting to match someone’s face to the face of all users on
the social network (which may include many millions of people), service
providers will frequently limit the set of possible candidates to the known
associates of the person who has uploaded the photo (which is more likely
to be in the hundreds). Limiting the candidate pool makes the task of
comparing faces much less challenging, computationally speaking, and
63. Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/19DNA.html [https://perma.cc/5NGE-CLRH]. Forensic
DNA databases significantly overrepresent Black and Latino individuals due to disparities in arrest
and imprisonment, leading to concerns about further racial profiling and deepening inequities in
criminal justice contact rates. See Peter A. Chow-White & Troy Duster, Do Health and Forensic DNA
Databases Increase Racial Disparities?, 8 PLOS MED. (2011).
64. Recent scholarship has explored the constitutionality of such procedures. See David Kaye, The
Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109
(2013); Murphy, supra note 59. Practicing lawyers have begun to raise such objections, as in the 2019
case of Jesse Bjerke, identified through familial search as the prime suspect in a 2016 rape in
Alexandria, Virginia. Bjerke’s defense attorney sought to have the DNA evidence that lead to his
identification excluded, arguing that the act of extracting genetic information from Bjerke’s discarded
materials constituted a search that should have required a warrant. Note that his attorney did not raise
a constitutional challenge to the search against the genetic database (i.e., against others’ data); the
focus was on the collection of his own data. To date, lawyers have not tested the constitutionality of
the matching process itself. Rachel Weiner, Alexandria Rape Suspect Challenging DNA Search Used
to Crack Case, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/alexandria-rape-suspect-challenging-dna-search-used-to-crack-case/2019/06/10/24bd0e3487a5-11e9-a870-b9c411dc4312_story.html [https://perma.cc/D94T-7RXH]. For now, the police’s
ability to perform familial searches is only limited by the terms of service set by the operators of
genetic databases, which has been a major point of controversy. States like Maryland have begun to
consider legislation that addresses this problem head-on. Megan Molteni, Should Cops Use Family
Tree
Forensics?
Maryland
Isn’t
So
Sure,
WIRED
(Feb.
6,
2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/maryland-considers-banning-genetic-genealogy-forensics/
[https://perma.cc/WV8R-NJUG].
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cuts down on the risk of false matches, which grows as more candidates
are considered.65 To return to our familiar characters, the social network
might exploit the fact that Bob belongs to Alice’s articulated social
network—that they are “friends”—to increase the likelihood of correctly
matching a face in one of Alice’s uploaded photos to Bob. Because users
are more likely to take photographs of and with their friends than with
strangers, facial recognition is markedly improved when it integrates
information about a user’s social network.66 Knowing that Alice and Bob
are friends makes it far easier for a social network to identify Bob by sight
when he appears in Alice’s photos.

4.

Tie-Justified Observation

Social ties between Alice and Bob may be used to justify expanding
the scope of surveillance from an initial focus on Alice to also include
Bob. Here, the Observer’s aim is often to build a broadly inclusive
database rather than to learn about any specific user; in other words, the
value of observing Alice stems from Alice’s connection to many Bobs,
rather than to a specific Bob. For example, the National Security Agency’s
bulk telephony metadata program relied on a practice known as “contactchaining,” analyzing phone records that were up to three degrees of
separation—or “hops”—out from a suspected terrorist.67 Effectively, this
allowed the NSA to collect data from about 20 million people for each
initial target.68 (In 2014, President Obama limited the scope of inquiry to
two degrees of separation away from a suspect seed—approximately
25,000 people per suspect.)69 The three-hop (and then two-hop) rule relied
explicitly on a network tie between Alice and Bob as a justification for
data collection about Bob.
65. Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and
Implementation Issues, CTR. CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE 3 (2009),
https://nissenbaum.tech.cornell.edu/papers/facial_recognition_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FSB-PJ9D]
(“Given that the number of possible images that enter the gallery as near-identical mathematical
representations (biometric doubles) increases as the size of the gallery increases, restricting the size of the
gallery . . . may help maintain the integrity of the system and increase overall performance.”).
66. ZAK STONE ET AL., AUTOTAGGING FACEBOOK: SOCIAL NETWORK CONTEXT IMPROVES PHOTO
ANNOTATION, IEEE COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION WORKSHOPS (2008).
67. David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC’Y L. & POL’Y 209 (2014).
68. Amy Nordrum, NSA Can Legally Access Metadata of 25,000 Callers Based on a Single
Suspect’s Phone, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 16, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/techtalk/telecom/security/nsa-can-legally-access-metadata-of-25000-callers-based-on-a-single-suspectsphone-analysis-suggests [https://perma.cc/H7AB-SN4H].
69. Id. Even under the two-hop rule, targeting only 1% of individuals allows the observer access to
46% of all communications in the network. Laura Radaelli et al., Quantifying Surveillance in the
Networked
Age:
Node-based
Intrusions
and
Group
Privacy,
ARXIV (2018),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.09007.pdf [https://perma.cc/J33D-GLSF].
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Online social networks often use social ties to set conditions of
visibility for their users. For example, Facebook’s former privacy settings
were premised on network structure: a previous default setting allowed
friends of your friends (i.e., people two degrees from a given person) to
see certain components of that person’s profile.70 The company employed
the same reasoning in determining which information would be available
to other actors on the platform: at one point, third-party apps were allowed
to collect data from a consenting user’s (presumably non-consenting)
friends. In the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 270,000 Facebook users
took a personality quiz through a Facebook app; the app then collected
personal data not only from those directly observed users, but also from
those users’ friends—widening the net to an estimated 87 million
indirectly observed users.71
Tie-justified observation allows the Observer to learn about many Bobs
because they happen to be connected to Alice. Two- or three-hop searches
justified by such connections can give Observers permission to learn
about far more Bobs than one might expect if the social network includes
a number of high-degree nodes—that is, a person in the network that has
a particularly large number of connections.72 If Alice only has a small
number of friends, but Bob has a huge number of friends, Alice’s
connection to Bob would allow an Observer to justify searching Bob’s far
larger network as well. And if a large proportion of a social network is
less than two or three hops from someone like Bob, an Observer might
find that they are able to investigate most of the network without having
to make any further hops. Effectively, tie-justified observation can easily
create a dragnet, in which the number of observed parties far exceeds the
number of initial targets.
In the most sympathetic reading, an ostensible justification for such
collection is that researchers interested in issues involving social
networks—information contagion, the influence of network position on
behavior, etc.—can learn much about Alice from learning about those to
whom she is connected; in this sense, collection of information about the
Bobs to whom Alice is connected is a way of deepening the Observer’s
knowledge of Alice. In the NSA contact-chaining case, for example,
expanding the scope of surveillance from merely a target to a target’s

70. Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1158.
71. David C. Vladeck, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and the Regulator’s Dilemma: Clueless or
Venal?, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-and-the-regulators-dilemma-clueless-or-venal/ [https://perma.cc/3GH2-VUZ6].
72. The existence of high-degree hubs (like voicemail services with millions of users) facilitates
the scale of observation premised on network tie by creating a large number of new routes to
observation via a single phone number. Jonathan Mayer, MetaPhone: The NSA Three-Hop, WEB
POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013), http://webpolicy.org/2013/12/09/metaphone-the-nsa-three-hop/
[https://perma.cc/N4CA-Q526].
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associates (and those associates’ associates) was controversially justified
by virtue of the relevance of those parties’ communications to the target.73
But this expansive notion of relevance was used to justify even wider
observation: that associates of a known suspect are likely to have
additional associates of their own who are worthy of suspicion. Collecting
such information was seen as necessary to uncover a coordinating group
of suspects (for example, a terrorist cell).74 However, in its review of the
program, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board argued that too
many “hops” reduces the relevance of the average tie to the initial target,
effectively amounting to dragnet collection.75
***
Observation premised on tie varies in terms of the nature of the
association between Alice and Bob (genetic; articulated; based on
physical proximity or communication), the intentionality with which
Bob’s data are observed via Alice (from incidentally being “caught in the
net” of observing Alice, on one end of the spectrum, to purposive and
coercive circumvention of obstacles to observing Bob directly, on the
other), and the specificity with which Bob is targeted by the Observer
(whose goal may be to obtain information about a particular Bob or to
build a broad social graph of many Bobs). But in all cases, the Observer
learns about Bob by “piggybacking” on the tie between Alice and Bob.
Tie-based dependencies tend to implicate the perceived sanctity of our
relations with family and friends; our connections to other people,
whether severable or persistent, ought not be the source of unconstrained
and unanticipated privacy violation. The notion that law enforcement
73. Robert Chesney, Telephony Metadata: Is the Contact-Chaining Program Unsalvageable?,
LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/telephony-metadata-contactchaining-program-unsalvageable [https://perma.cc/8NMK-9JSV] (explaining expansion of bulk
collection program from “records [pertaining] directly to the agent of a foreign power as defined in
FISA, as opposed to spouses, friends or others whose records might well be relevant too[]” to
authority where “materials did not belong to or pertain to the particular target (and thus the provision
might be used to gather records about an associate of the target)” (emphasis added)). Id. Chesney
goes on to note the faultiness of the relevance justification, which the government argued justified
collection of an entire comprehensive database as necessary to enable contact-chaining. Id.
74. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 4 (Aug. 9, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/nsa/bulk-215.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QC9B-LJGL] (“Following the trail [via contact-chaining] . . . allows focused
inquiries on numbers of interest, thus potentially revealing a contact at the second or third ‘hop’ from
the seed telephone number that connects to a different terrorist-associated telephone number already
known to the analyst.”).
75. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FISC 171 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215 Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_P
rogram.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6DE-RPVB] (“Each additional hop from the original ‘selector’ makes
the connection more remote and adds exponentially greater numbers of ‘false positives’ to the query
results. The value of connections becomes more limited as the contact chain is extended and it
becomes more difficult to sift through the results.”).
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might exploit our families’ genetic linkages to us, or that a social network
might seize upon our articulated friendships to glean our data, may strike
us as a profane intrusion into sacred territory. When surveillance is
premised on whom you know, we are concerned about the degree to which
it impinges on your right to associate freely.76
As explained, some information leakage through our relationships is an
inevitable side effect of social life—but social norms and interpersonal
sanctions have long been relied upon as adequate regulatory mechanisms
to restrict unwelcome exposure. Close social ties can both limit and
facilitate disclosure, and relationships may operate under the “shadow”
influence of a potential Observer. But these considerations do not apply
when Alice’s disclosure about Bob is unknowing or involuntary—Dennis
Rader’s daughter almost surely did not consider that her Pap smear would
eventually provide incriminating evidence against her father;77 Cambridge
Analytica’s quiz-takers are unlikely to have considered the privacy
interests of their friends when they divulged their data.78 When
observation depends on the existence of a connection between Alice and
Bob rather than on disclosure of the particular information they share
(e.g., the NSA’s collection of telephony metadata rather than content), the
notion that social norms will limit disclosure is similarly weak.79

B.

Similarity

Inference provides yet another—and more circuitous—route to learn
about Bob through Alice. When Alice discloses information about herself,
she may reveal certain things about Bob as well, if Bob is understood to
be similar to Alice. That is, the Observer might conclude that Bob likely
shares the trait disclosed by Alice if the Observer already knows that Alice
76. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 745 (2008).
77. Natalie Ram suggests looking to the law of tenancy by the entirety for a framework on how to
reconcile multiple (and potentially divergent) interests in shared genetic information. Like genetic relations,
tenancy by the entirety is a form of property right in which ownership inheres neither in one spouse nor the
other, but in the couple together. Ram draws from this arrangement by analogy in proposing a framework
for genetic data. See Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2015).
78. David Vladeck’s argument that friends should be seen as users too: “The FTC’s investigation
will focus on a user’s reasonable expectations – that is, what did users and their friends understand
their ‘privacy’ settings to mean? Were users clearly and unmistakably informed that permitting
sharing with friends meant broad and virtually unrestricted access to their data by third parties? Did
the ‘friends’ understand the breadth of third-party access to their data based on decisions that others
made?” Vladeck, supra note 71.
79. Despite this, Facebook makes an implausible appeal to norms when urging users to upload their
contact lists, informing users on the “Learn More” screen that “You may have business or personal
contacts in your phone . . . . Please only send friend requests to people you know personally who
would welcome the invite.” Kashmir Hill, How Facebook Figures Out Everyone You’ve Ever Met,
GIZMODO (Nov. 7, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/how-facebook-figures-out-everyone-youve-evermet-1819822691 [https://perma.cc/L9FD-MVK8].
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and Bob resemble each other in many other respects. In this case, the
Observer has drawn an inductive inference from its encounter with
Alice—that people with a certain set of observable characteristics will
also have the disclosed trait. When confronted by Bob, the Observer might
recognize that Bob shares these observable characteristics and that Bob is
therefore likely to have this additional, unobserved trait as well. Note that
the Observer needs to know something about Bob in order to apply lessons
that it has drawn from Alice and others—that is, whether Bob possesses
those characteristics that have tended to correlate with the trait in question
among other people the Observer has encountered in the past. Unlike
information about the sought-after trait, these characteristics might be
much more readily observed or more freely disclosed. In fact, these
characteristics might be difficult or impossible to conceal or they might
seem much more innocuous and thus less worthy of privacy protection.80
This allows the Observer to sidestep the task—and associated difficulties
and discomforts—of observing or asking about the trait directly; instead,
the Observer can make a statistically-motivated guess that Bob is likely to
follow the same pattern as other people with his same observable
characteristics.81 The ability to draw and apply such inferences means that
Alice’s disclosures can implicate those similar to her. And it means that
observations of Alice can be brought to bear on others who happen to
share other known characteristics.
We might understand this dynamic as a form of generalizing, profiling,
or stereotyping, where the expectations that the Observer might have
about Bob depend on general lessons drawn from particular examples
involving many similar Alices. After interacting with many lawyers, for
example, an Observer might draw the general conclusion that all lawyers
are dishonest. Upon learning that Bob is a lawyer, the Observer might
doubt his honesty, too, even though the Observer has no personal
experience with him lying. While this conclusion might feel unfounded or
objectionable, inductive reasoning of this sort is foundational to human
cognition: observations about a specific individual are always made
meaningful against a backdrop of experience with others.82 Learning that
someone is a lawyer is of no significance to the Observer unless the

80. Solon Barocas, Panic Inducing: Data Mining, Fairness, and Privacy 73–74 (2014)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with authors).
81. See Solon Barocas, Leaps and Bounds: Toward a Normative Theory of Inferential Privacy 17–
21 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
82. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 65–67 (2009).
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Observer can channel its prior history with lawyers to give substance to
the category.83
Years ago, Tal Zarsky pointed out that a customer who reveals their
shopping patterns on a website may implicate a non-customer who shares
the customer’s gender, wealth, and zip code because the website can use
a model to infer that the non-customer will have similar shopping
preferences.84 Any individual’s privacy ultimately depends on what
similar people are willing to disclose or what has otherwise been learned
about them.85 In prior work, we showed that this dynamic can lead to a
tyranny of the minority, whereby a small number of willing disclosers
might determine what observers can then infer about the broader
populations to which they belong.86 Even if a majority of people abstain
from disclosing such details or go out of their way to evade observation,
the minority of people who happily give up some information may allow
observers to uncover the more easily observable or readily disclosed facts
that serve as reliable proxies for the sought-after details.87
In many respects, this is the goal of a well-executed scientific study:
drawing generally applicable conclusions from a limited sample.88 When

83. Of course, the stereotype could also have little or nothing to do with the Observer’s experience
with Alice and those like her. Instead, the stereotype might reflect the Observer’s prejudices and
biases, loosely connected to or completely detached from any personal encounters with Alice and
others like her—gross generalizations or unfounded conclusions. Such stereotypes are rarely learned
from direct contact with people so stereotyped; rather, stereotypes tend to gain purchase and their
broader cultural force through everyday communication and media representations. Even so, the
Observer’s ability to assign significance to certain attributes held by Bob will depend on the assertions
and representations that others have made about people like Alice.
84. Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based Solutions for the
Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV.
13, 43–44 (2004) (describing how one customer who reveals his shopping patterns on a website may
implicate a non-customer who shares the customer’s gender, wealth, and zip code, because the website
can use a model to infer that the non-customer will have similar shopping preferences). Mark
MacCarthy has likewise explained that “[d]ata from people who have revealed information about
themselves through surveys, transactions, and other voluntary disclosures are part of the evidentiary
basis for the knowledge revealed by [data mining] techniques. But they apply to other people who
have never disclosed that information about themselves.” MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 425.
85. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 10, at 405 (“Aggregated data contributions serve to train machine learning
algorithms, such that the data offered by one person trains an algorithm that impacts someone else.”).
86. Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent, in
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 44, 61–63 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
87. Id.
88. In fact, principles from research ethics demand that researchers enlist the minimal number of
research subjects necessary to produce reliable and generalizable findings. Bruno M. Cesana & Paolo
Antonelli, Sample Size Calculations in Clinical Research Should Also Be Based on Ethical Principles,
17 TRIALS 149, 149 (2016) (“Most statistical methods implemented in controlled clinical trials
(CCTs) have the aim of reducing the number of enrolled patients. This aim not only meets the a priori
imperative of exposing the minimum number of patients to the burdens of a trial but also fulfills the
a posteriori imperative that as few patients as possible are administered the treatment that proves to
be inferior.” (footnote omitted)); see also Peter Bacchetti et al., Ethics and Sample Size, 161 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 105, 106 (2005).

04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES

6/6/20 1:12 PM

579

the voluntary disclosures of a willing group of research subjects benefit a
broader population, these benefits could be viewed as positive
externalities. When these discoveries place others’ privacy at risk, the
same results could be considered negative externalities. In the first case,
Bob might benefit from Alice’s decision to participate in a medical study
that results in findings applicable to Bob because he shares relevant
characteristics with Alice. In the second case, Bob may lose the ability to
withhold certain information about himself because Alice has divulged
certain medical details and because Bob shares the readily observable
characteristics discovered to correlate with Alice’s disclosed condition.
Of course, the same discovery could play both roles at the same time—
helping Bob in some cases and harming him in others.89
In most cases, Bob will have no way of keeping Alice from disclosing
details that implicate him. Nor will he have any way to prevent the
Observer from using Alice’s disclosures to draw inferences about him.90
And yet differences in the dimensions through which the Observer views
Alice and Bob as similar can have profound implications for the perceived
legitimacy of these inferences. Ultimately, generalizations, profiles, and
stereotypes all rest on identifying what is relevantly similar about the
people who exhibit some quality. The basis upon which a person is
understood to be similar can feel extremely proximate or quite distant. At
their closest, inferences about your character might depend upon the
company you keep. Or inferences might depend on the socially salient
characteristics that you share with others (e.g., gender, race, and age), but
with whom you hold no explicit social ties. More distantly, inferences
might rest on characteristics that have little social salience (e.g., your

89. This differs from traditional concerns about “group privacy,” which have focused on the risks
of reporting aggregate statistics from research studies, especially those involving stigmatized medical
conditions. If Alice and Bob are known to have participated in a study, then even general statements
about the research population can reveal something about them. For example, reporting that 40% of
the population suffers from depression means that an Observer can now make a reasoned guess that
Alice and Bob have a 40% chance of being depressed. If researchers further report the different rates
at which men and women in the study suffer from depression, then the Observer can use Alice and
Bob’s gender to make an even more precise guess about their probability of being depressed. Now
consider what happens if researchers present these as generalizable findings rather than aggregate
statistics about a particular set of research subjects. Suddenly, all men and women might be subject
to this inference as well, even if they were not involved in the study. See MacCarthy, supra note 20,
at 458 (describing concerns that medical testing on individual Ashkenazi Jews, who gave voluntary
consent, could negatively implicate anyone from such group, because the results could be applied to
stigmatize Ashkenazi Jews more generally).
90. See, e.g., Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking
Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 494, 543 (2019)
(explaining how the GDPR fails to provide meaningful protection against inference).
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preferred web browser91) but nevertheless distinguish the group to which
you belong from others with respect to the sought-after quality. In each
case, making sense of any particular observation or disclosure ultimately
depends on inferences rendered on the basis of knowledge about others.
And yet, how we are seen as relevantly similar will often dictate whether
we are willing to accept or tolerate the resulting inference.

1.

The Company You Keep

Consider the inferential bridge that social relationships might provide
an Observer. We might infer, for example, that members of the same
family are likely to resemble one another along some dimension (“the
apple doesn’t fall far from the tree”). Given the Observer’s knowledge
about Alice and the discovery that Bob is Alice’s son, the Observer might
conclude that Bob is likely to possess many of the same qualities that
Alice is known to possess. Such reasoning might rest on the knowledge
that certain traits are hereditary, but it could also depend on the belief that
parents impart certain qualities to their children through their upbringing.
The COMPAS tool—the subject of a well-known ProPublica
investigation of “machine bias”92—asks defendants about the criminal
history of their parents to help predict whether they are likely to recidivate
if released pending trial.93 This might seem like a straightforward case of
punishing the child for the sins of a parent. But the relevant point of
similarity is not only that Alice and Bob are related, but that other parents
have tended to pass along these qualities to their children as well. In other
words, the Observer concludes that Bob is likely to recidivate if Alice has
a criminal history because other people with parents like Alice have also
gone on to recidivate.
Similar inferences might follow if Alice and Bob share a household.
Recent attempts to predict opioid abuse, for example, operate by assigning
risk scores to patients, and then making those scores available to insurers
and hospitals to be used in prescription decisions. A higher risk score may
be assigned to people whose fellow household members have a history of
abuse, even if there is no documented misuse.94 An Observer predicts that
91. Joe Pinsker, People Who Use Firefox or Chrome Are Better Employees, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/people-who-use-firefox-or-chromeare-better-employees/387781/ [https://perma.cc/R7H5-JLBR].
92. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/7UUX-GZGX].
93. Sample COMPAS Risk Assessment, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html
[https://perma.cc/6G3F-BC6S]
(specifically
questions 33, 34, 37, and 38).
94. Mohana Ravindranath, How Your Health Information is Sold and Turned Into ‘Risk Scores,’
POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/health-risk-scores-opioid-
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Bob is more likely to abuse opioids because it knows that Alice has abused
opioids, that Alice lives in the same place as Bob, and that people tend to
abuse opioids at a higher rate if they live with other abusers. At first blush,
this approach seems to have more in common with the tie-based
dependencies that allow an Observer to discover certain things about Bob
because it is keeping track of Alice: knowing that Alice has an opioid
prescription and that Alice lives with Bob means that an Observer also
knows that Bob has easy access to Alice’s medicine. Yet this observation
alone might not help predict Bob’s risk of abuse, unless the Observer has
found that other people in similar circumstances as Bob—for instance,
those with easy access to others’ drugs—have been more likely to
abuse opioids.
Information about people’s broader social networks can also serve as
the basis for inferences about undisclosed or unobserved characteristics.95
The ability to infer things about people based on their connections to
others in a social network first drew significant attention among privacy
scholars when researchers demonstrated that sexual orientation could be
predicted from one’s friends’ disclosures of sexual orientation.96 In other
words, even if Bob withholds information about his own sexual
orientation, his explicit connection to people who have disclosed may
improve an Observer’s ability to accurately infer that of Bob.97 In addition
to sexual orientation, previous research has shown that information from
Bob’s friends can accurately predict characteristics like religion, location,
and who Bob’s other friends are—even in the absence of Bob providing
such information himself.98 In fact, even information about Bob’s friends
abuse-1139978 [https://perma.cc/E63S-HPUR] (noting that risk scores for opioid addiction and
overdose take into account “information about a patient’s friends, family, and roommates”); see also
Mathijs de Vaan et al., Diffusion of Opioids Within the Family Household (2018) (working paper) (on
file with authors).
95. See MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 452–53. See generally Alan Mislove et al., You Are Who You
Know: Inferring User Profiles in Online Social Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ACM
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB SEARCH AND DATA MINING 251 (2010).
96. Carter Jernigan & Behram F.T. Mistree, Gaydar: Facebook Friendships Expose Sexual
Orientation, 14 FIRST MONDAY (2009), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2611/
2302 [https://perma.cc/68NA-SE8J].
97. In fact, researchers have found that a good deal of private information (including sexual
orientation) can be inferred about nonusers from data given over by users. See David Garcia, Leaking
Privacy and Shadow Profiles in Online Social Networks, 3 SCI. ADVANCES (Aug. 4, 2017),
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/3/8/e1701172.full [https://perma.cc/GHK6-MYMW].
98. David Garcia, Privacy Beyond the Individual, 3 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 112, 112 (2019).
Moreover, even in cases in which Bob does provide some information himself, the predictive power
of his friends’ data can be even greater than his own. See id. (“the data produced by our online friends
can be a better predictor of our future behavior than our own data” (emphasis added)); James P.
Bagrow et al., Information Flow Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity, 3 NATURE HUM.
BEHAV. 122, 124–25 (2019) (when predicting the words a person was likely to use in a future social
media post, the person’s friends’ posts were more informative than the person’s own past posts).
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of friends (that is, people two hops away from Bob in the network) can be
the basis for strong prediction of Bob’s own attributes.99
Recent attempts to leverage social network data in credit scoring rely
on inferences like these.100 These inferences operate in two rather different
ways. First, the Observer might believe that social networks exhibit
homophily (“love of sameness”) as to a particular quality—
creditworthiness—and that people in a network are thus likely to be
similar to one another in that respect, allowing the Observer to impute
what it knows about Bob’s associates to Bob himself.101 Or, the Observer
might have learned that other people with a similar group of friends as
Bob tend to default on their loans, even if Bob’s friends do not. In this
case, the inference depends on Bob’s similarity to other people with such
friends, not on the similarity between Bob and Bob’s friends. Note that
both cases involve drawing inferences from past observations. In the first
case, the concept of homophily that allows the Observer to judge Bob on
the basis of his friends grows out of prior observations of social networks
exhibiting homophily. In the second case, the Observer may penalize Bob
because other people with a similar set of friends as Bob have tended to
default in the past.
We may be especially concerned about drawing negative inferences
about Bob based on his social ties when those ties are non-volitional: for
example, Bob did not choose his parents. It may strike us as deeply unfair
to punish Bob for relationships completely outside his control, rather than
for his own conduct.102 But we may still object, in some cases, when we
make inferences about Bob based on associates over which he has more
control—his friends, for example—based on a concern about chilling his
association with potentially “hazardous” Alices. In aggregate, the effect
of many Bobs defensively curating their social networks to avoid negative
inferences might deepen social stratification, impede socioeconomic
mobility, and contribute to polarization, both on- and offline.103
99. Some social networks exhibit monophily (or “love of one”)—that is, people may have extreme
preferences for others with a particular trait that is not necessarily their own (for example, a woman
with friends who are mostly men). Kristen M. Altenburger & Johan Ugander, Monophily in Social
Networks Introduces Similarity Among Friends-of-Friends, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 284, 284
(2018). Recent research demonstrates that in networks with this property, Bob’s attributes can be
strongly predicted by comparing him to friends of friends. Id. at 284. Altenburger and Ugander’s
study demonstrates that “friends-of-friends (‘the company you’re kept in’) can disclose private
attribute information that is otherwise undisclosed by friends (‘the company you keep’).” Id. at 284.
100. See generally Yanhao Wei et al., Credit Scoring with Social Network Data, 35 MARKETING
SCI. 234 (2015).
101. EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 29, at 77–79.
102. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 24:16 (New International Version) (“Parents are not to be put to death
for their children, nor children put to death for their parents; each will die for their own sin.”).
103. Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be
Unnetworked, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 392–99 (2016) (“[R]ational users aware of potential
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Socially Salient Group

As we have argued elsewhere, similar inferences can be drawn about
people even without knowledge of their explicit ties to others.104
Characteristics like gender, race, and age, for example, function as the
basis for a whole range of routine inferences, both trivial and profound,
even when the people who share these characteristics do not share any
direct social connection. Thus, Alice and Bob may be strangers to one
another, but their similar age might lead an Observer to believe that Bob
shares many of Alice’s other observed traits.
Such inferences can be so mundane as to seem unworthy of discussion,
but consider their practical import: businesses have long relied on broad
demographic categories to differentiate among customers, trusting that
such categories reliably predict consumer preferences and behavior, given
past observations of people with these characteristics.105 Knowing only
someone’s gender, race, or age allows marketers to bring to bear an
enormous amount of prior observations about the tendencies of people in
these demographic groups. Coveted markets like “men aged 18–24” are a
cultural cliché, but the cliché reveals the extent to which we are always
understood in terms of those like us.106
Characteristics like these frequently figure into our everyday inferences
because they are highly visible and allow us to quickly bring to bear all
that we associate with people with these characteristics. This also gives
these characteristics a unique social salience—a deeply felt sense that
these are among the most important qualities that define us and that allow
us to identify with others like us.
When and why we are likely to view characteristics as socially salient
characteristics matters for the perceived legitimacy of the resulting
inferences. A person might feel social affinity with others on the basis of
a wide range of characteristics, ranging from gender to neighborhood or

financial harm from certain online interactions may seek to remove hazardous links while
strengthening beneficial social ties. They may sanitize their list of friends by unfriending those who
went bankrupt, lost their jobs, live in a poor neighborhood, or are otherwise perceived as financially
risky, and by permitting their social network friends to include only those with good careers and
financial standing.”).
104. See, e.g., Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 86, at 62 (explaining that inferences can be
drawn about people based on their resemblance to others “with whom they have no meaningful or
recognized relations.”).
105. See generally JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA
WORLD (1997).
106. Of course, decision-makers could also rely on a lack of common characteristics, where your
dissimilarity from a group about which much is known means that you’re assumed not to possess one
of the qualities that defines the group. For example, employers might think that certain job applicants
could not be qualified because they do not fit the stereotype for the particular role.
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occupation, but also seemingly more trivial things like one’s food
preferences.107 All of these might be socially salient in the sense that
people understand their connections to others in these terms and recognize
that these shared traits might imply a broader set of common beliefs and
experiences. And yet there are morally relevant differences in how certain
characteristics come to be perceived as socially salient. In some cases,
certain characteristics might emerge organically as those that feel like an
especially relevant point of both social differentiation (“we are a unique
group!”) and social solidarity (“we share so much in common!”). In other
cases, certain characteristics might have deep social salience because they
have served as the basis for imposing the social differentiation necessary
for establishing and maintaining social hierarchies. The social
significance of a characteristic like race flows in part from the fact that it
has served—and continues to serve—as an explicit basis
for subjugation.108
In recognition of this history, the law forbids inferences on the basis of
certain socially salient characteristics in the kinds of high-stakes decisions
that shape people’s life chances and life course. In particular,
discrimination law enumerates a set of characteristics that must not figure
into decisions in such areas as employment,109 credit,110 and housing.111
While philosophers and legal scholars have advanced competing
normative theories to account for the wrongfulness of discrimination, the
law seems to have singled out these characteristics for special treatment
because these characteristics have served as the basis for unjust
deprivations in the past.112 Under certain theories, discrimination leads to
an unjust deprivation when a decision is driven by a decision-maker’s
animus or prejudice.113 Other theories view discrimination’s wrongfulness
in terms of its coarse groupings and crass stereotypes—inferences that
lack sufficient accuracy or precision, thus depriving the deserving of

107. See Kim Severson, What’s for Dinner? The Pollster Wants to Know, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/dining/16voters.html [https://perma.cc/636A-VMYU].
108. See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, The Badness of Discrimination, 9 ETHICAL THEORY &
MORAL PRAC. 167, 169 (2006). In the United States, for much of the twentieth century, overt
discrimination on the basis of race was commonplace, depriving people of basic rights, and limiting
their ability to seek employment, housing, or credit. Public expressions of racial animus were routine;
demeaning race-based stereotypes were pervasive. Everyday life was shot through with racism. See
generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
109. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018).
110. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018).
111. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.
112. Andrew Altman, Discrimination, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/AB8B-LJ98].
113. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
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important opportunities114 and needlessly condemning entire social
groups to categorical judgment.115 Still others trace the injustice of
discrimination back to the lesser moral status that it seems to accord
specific social groups, as if these socially salient characteristics justify
showing certain people less respect.116 The law formalizes these various
intuitions by prohibiting certain decision-makers from viewing people as
relevantly similar on the basis of these protected characteristics.
Notably, discrimination law prohibits decision-makers from
considering these characteristics even when they demonstrate predictive
value.117 Drawing accurate inferences on the basis of membership in a
protected class does not make such inferences lawful. Rather,
discrimination law forbids decision-makers from falling back on, for
example, race- or gender-based heuristics, even when doing so may serve
a seemingly rational goal.118 Instead, the law forces decision-makers to
identify other points of similarity among those who hold the sought-after
quality.119 This reflects a belief that people should never be judged merely
or even partially on their membership in a protected class because these
categories lack moral relevance when assessing someone for a job, a loan,
or an apartment. In other words, discrimination law views the potential
statistical relevance of protected characteristics as itself morally suspect—
as a statistical artifact of some past injustice that cannot justify subjecting
people to further disadvantage.
While we might resist all sorts of generalizations, profiles, or
stereotypes, the law only forbids those that involve socially salient
characteristics that are essential to people’s self-definition and have
served as the basis for systematic oppression in the past.

3.

Non-Socially-Salient Group

Finally, statistical analysis may also reveal that certain qualities tend to
correlate with characteristics that we might not think of as socially
meaningful. Rather than using recognizable demographic categories (like
gender, race, or age) to target marketing to a group, advertisers might use
behavioral data, like what websites users tend to visit, as the basis for
targeting. As Brian d’Alessandro explains, “[t]raditionally, demographic
114. See generally ALAN GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (2015).
115. Schauer, supra note 82, at 22–24.
116. See generally DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 35–37 (2008).
117. See Michelle R. Gomez, The Next Generation of Disparate Treatment: A Merger of Law and
Social Science, 32 REV. LITIG. 553, 562 (2013).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 562–63 n.32.
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and lifestyle data has served as a proxy for a good audience. With modern
server logs holding behavioral data that tracks every last click, marketing
firms can do away with the proxies and build audience segments with a
high likelihood to take some sort of specific action.”120 Such innovations
mean that we cannot take for granted that the features that define a group
will correspond with the existing broad categories of social identity,
including the categories protected by discrimination law. These inferences
do not rely on an articulable social identity to get at some quality that is
difficult to observe directly; rather, they identify entirely new ways to
recognize relevant points of similarity. But these are not social groups in
any meaningful sense.121 They do not share any basis for social kinship
because the group definition is entirely decoupled from those personal
attributes and activities through which we experience identity.
Facebook offers advertisers a targeting mechanism that makes this shift
clear. Traditionally, advertisers might have come to Facebook with a preestablished market in mind (e.g., men aged eighteen to twenty-four),
which they would target using Facebook’s demographic-based tools. In
contrast, advertisers can now also ask the social network to find so-called
“lookalike audiences”122—other users on the social network who
resemble those who have previously exhibited an interest in the advertised
product or service. Facebook does this by first finding points of similarity
among those who have interacted with the advertiser in the past and then
looks for other users who share these same points of similarity.123
Notably, Facebook is able to consider an enormous range of possible
points of similarity because the social network has such detailed and wideranging information about people, their interests, their associations, and
their behaviors. As a result, the relevant points of similarity identified by
Facebook might involve a mix of characteristics that, if revealed, would
not be terribly meaningful to humans.
Even when such groupings demonstrate statistical validity—that is,
even when the computationally generated “lookalike audiences” end up
exhibiting significantly more interest in the advertised products or
services than other users—the characteristics that underlie these groups
may feel rather arbitrary. As a consequence, the decision to treat people
that belong to this group differently than others can feel equally arbitrary,
no matter how accurately group membership predicts a specific outcome
of interest. If the characteristics that decision-makers view as relevant do
120. Brian d’Alessandro, Actions Predict Louder Than Words, O’REILLY RADAR (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://radar.oreilly.com/2013/10/actions-predict-louder-than-words.html [https://perma.cc/QW69-4LG5].
121. Vedder, supra note 17, at 278.
122. Ad Targeting, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/a/lookalike-audiences
(last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
123. Create a Lookalike Audience, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/
465262276878947?id=401668390442328 (last visited May 9, 2010).
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not map onto socially salient differences in the world, the decisionmaking that relies on this differentiation may lack perceived legitimacy.124
For example, even though our cultural tastes—in literature, music, film,
and cuisine, among other things—often serve as the basis for inferences
about our intelligence, we are unlikely to recognize our interest in “Curly
Fries” as a reasonable basis for concluding that we must have a high IQ,
despite empirical research establishing this correlation.125 Rather than
objecting to the treatment of a specific group, we might object to the idea
that this is even a meaningful group in the first place.
The novel computational techniques like machine learning that allow
us to identify these new points of relevant similarity raise one of the most
basic questions about discrimination law and other frameworks for
assessing the fairness of decision-making: what groups are sufficiently
vulnerable that they warrant special protection? Even though “[t]he
concept of discrimination itself places no substantive restrictions on
which salient social groups could, in principle, count for purposes of
determining whether an act is an act of discrimination,”126 new
computational methods are deeply troubling because they confound
attempts to even arrive at definitions of social groups that hold any
resonance.127 The set of characteristics that discrimination law recognizes
as an illegitimate basis for decision-making are those that have served as
the basis for subjugation and unjust treatment in the past. The salience of
characteristics like gender, race, age, religion, marital status, sexual
orientation, and national origin, among others recognized in law, stems
from the fact that decision-makers and institutions have previously and
explicitly relied on these characteristics to justify their adverse actions. In
contrast, we are unlikely to view blue shoe-wearing people as a group
entitled to special legal protection under discrimination law, even if
critical decisions rest on inferences drawn on that basis. The seemingly
random characteristics that support today’s machine learning-driven

124. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1096–98 (2018).
125. See Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records
of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5804 (2013) (finding that one of the
Facebook Likes predicting high IQ is “Curly Fries”).
126. Altman, supra note 112.
127. Zarsky raised exactly such objections to an early settlement with DoubleClick that required
the company to grant data subjects access to the categories into which they had been slotted, arguing
that “the clusters formed are not required to conform to the taxonomy used to divide the population
in the past, or answer to catchy names such as ‘Pools and Patios’ or ‘Shotguns and Pickups.’ The
borders of such classes might be elaborate, not easily defined by a simple category name, and everchanging.” Tal Zarsky, Cookie Viewers and the Undermining of Data-Mining: A Critical Review of
the DoubleClick Settlement, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
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inferences may lack the necessary social history to elevate them to the
status of legally protected characteristics.128
Of course, decisions rendered on the basis of characteristics that lack
social salience may still result in disparities along socially salient lines. In
many cases, newly identified groups might map closely to traditional
social groups because many of the relevant points of similarity will be
correlated with protected characteristics. Thus, even when the basis for
decision-making lacks the necessary social salience and legal status to
bring a charge of disparate treatment, we may be able to observe and
contest any resulting disparate impact because we can map these
inequalities in outcome back to socially salient and legally protected
characteristics.129
But in other cases, there will be no apparent mapping between a set of
non-socially-salient factors and traditional social groups, taking us out of
the familiar realm of discrimination law. In those cases, people subject to
adverse decisions have no socially salient criteria from which to make
sense of and contest their treatment.130 As Jonathan Simon concludes, “the
effect of actuarial practices is precisely to make it more difficult for
groups to intensify their solidarity or to exercise political choice.”131
When inferences are drawn on the basis of broad demographic categories,
groups defined by these categories might be able to mobilize on that basis
to resist adverse treatment. Responding to these new groupings, in
contrast, requires solidarity in the absence of meaningful social ties.132

128. Zarsky suggests a novel approach to this issue: to the extent that predictive analytics premise
different treatment on attributes other than those that characterize existing salient social groups—say,
shopping habits or dietary preferences—and which people consider central to their self-definition, we
might explicitly add such elements as protected categories in antidiscrimination law. Tal Z. Zarsky,
An Analytic Challenge: Discrimination Theory in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
INFO. SOC’Y 11, 32–34 (2017).
129. See, e.g., Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad
Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes, ARXIV (Apr. 19, 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.02095
[https://perma.cc/SAB5-7UHG].
130. As de Vries points out, the demise of identity politics has its costs: “awareness of gender biases in
language . . . allows me to challenge this structure, for example, by structurally using ‘she’ and not ‘he’ as
a generic pronoun, or inventing new combinations: s/he. In contrast, in our present post-computational turn
era it could easily happen that I’m subjected to profiles, categories and semiotic structures (‘suspect type’,
‘profitable customer,’ etc.) of which I am not aware. This lack of knowledge and transparency . . . makes
it very difficult to challenge or critique those structures with the tools of the linguistic turn of the 1970s.”
Katja de Vries, Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: A Parable and a First Analysis, in
PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 9, 24 (2013).
131. Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 771, 787 (1988).
132. Virginia Eubanks notes that digital social sorting prevents the creation of solidarity across
race, gender, and class lines, in contrast to physical segregation and containment of people with
particular characteristics, which had “the unintentional result” of fomenting such solidarity. VIRGINIA
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE
POOR 184 (2018).
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***
While the similarity-based dependencies that we have described above
all involve the same practical mechanism—recognizing when a person
shares the same observable characteristics as those with a sought-after
trait and inferring that the person is likely to possess the trait as well—
they differ in what they identify as the relevant points of similarity. Being
judged on the basis of the company you keep, your membership in a
legally protected class, or your seemingly arbitrary grouping with others
each raises different concerns. We recoil at the idea of judging a child on
the basis of their parents’ misdeeds; we reject the notion that employers,
lenders, and landlords should be free to discriminate against a person
according to their gender; and we fail to recognize our solidarity with
others subject to the same treatment.
As a general matter, though, we might argue that people should be
judged for what they do, not for the behaviors of those with whom they
share certain characteristics. Similarity-based dependencies violate the
moral intuition that people deserve to be treated as individuals and subject
to individualized judgment. They also deny people the opportunity to
abstain from disclosing details that seemingly similar people have
willingly divulged. And yet there is no way to avoid using generalizations
or avoid being subject to them.133 As we’ve pointed out, “[i]nsurance
offers the most obvious example of this: the rate that a person pays for car
insurance, for instance, is determined by the way other people with similar
characteristics happen to drive, even if the person is a better driver than
those who resemble him on the statistically pertinent dimensions.”134 One
might retort that the insurer could do more to distinguish the person from
these drivers, finding additional characteristics that demonstrate that he is
a safer driver than most in the group. Yet even this maneuver rests on
identifying the ways in which the person is similar to other—safer—
drivers; it just does so on a larger number of dimensions. Once the insurer
has learned so much about the person that he ceases to resemble anyone
that the insurer has seen before, the insurer will not be able to improve the
precision of its predictions any further. In this sense, the insurer is simply
unable to judge the person as an individual. Any inference about his likely
driving must rest on comparisons to others.
Similarity-based dependencies are worrisome when they subject
people to coarse generalizations, but they can be equally worrisome when
they allow for overly granular distinctions. Once again, insurance nicely
illustrates this point. For some, the prospect of being lumped in with
133. Schauer, supra note 82, at 67.
134. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671,
688–89 n.67 (2016).
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others who are far less healthy may provoke outrage: insurance premiums
should reflect differences in people’s underlying health risks. For others,
the very purpose of insurance is to spread the costs of these risks across
policyholders: those in good health should cross-subsidize those in poor
health. Some healthcare laws forbid insurers from pursuing too much
granularity in pricing premiums.135 Community rating pricing schemes,
for example, require that all people in a given area receive the same
price—regardless of health status or other risk factors.136 The goal of this
restriction is to ensure that communities effectively socialize withincommunity differences in healthcare costs by offering everyone similar
premiums, even if insurers could figure out which individuals within the
community will prove more or less costly.137 Doing so prevents insurers
from charging high premiums to unhealthy people or denying them
coverage altogether.138

C.

Difference

A third sort of dependency involves difference between Alice and Bob.
In these cases, by revealing some information about herself to the
Observer, Alice allows the Observer to learn something about Bob by
making herself distinguishable from Bob. Importantly, Alice need have
no connection to, knowledge of, nor similarity to Bob for this to occur—
yet Bob’s privacy still depends upon Alice’s behavior, because it allows
the Observer to deduce something about Bob.
Here, we describe three subtypes of this dependency. In process of
elimination, Alice and Bob are members of a set of people suspected of
some proscribed behavior; when Alice tenders information about herself,
the Observer can winnow down the set to identify Bob. In anomaly
detection, the Observer already has information from all parties—but only
by comparing Bob’s data to that of more “normal” Alices is the Observer
able to make meaning from its atypicality. Finally, adverse inference
occurs when Bob chooses to withhold some bit of information, but most
Alices disclose—turning Bob’s nondisclosure into a signal that effectively
communicates the underlying information to the Observer.

135. Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Ithai Z. Lurie, Community Rating and the Market for Private NonGroup Health Insurance, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 264, 266 (2009).
136. Id.
137. The Affordable Care Act has an adjusted community rating requirement, meaning that
insurers are actually allowed to vary individual premiums based on certain factors like age and
tobacco use, but not others like previous medical claims. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1) (2018).
138. Santosh Rao, Q&A: Community Rating & Adjusted Community Rating Under the ACA, AM.
HEALTH LINE, https://www.americanhealthline.com/analysis-and-insight/question-and-answer/qand-a-community-rating [https://perma.cc/KB64-S8WV].
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Process of Elimination

In some cases, Alice may be motivated to provide information about
herself for exculpatory purposes, which by implication can teach the
Observer something about Bob. Assume, for instance, that law
enforcement knows that someone using a network in a university dorm
made a bomb threat to disrupt a final exam. Assume further that only two
people were using that dorm’s network at the time of the threat: Alice and
Bob. Having narrowed the set of likely suspects to these users, the police
approach Alice and interrogate her about her activities at the time the
threats were transmitted; Alice, being genuinely innocent and motivated
to establish as much to the police, shares with the police a convincing
alibi.139
Alice’s rendering of this information—purely about herself—gives the
police information about Bob by implication: specifically, that Bob, as the
only other member of the suspect set, is very likely the perpetrator of the
bomb threat.140 In the real world, law enforcement might have access to
such a suspect set in the context of “crime-out” investigations, in which
police obtain data (like IP addresses, cell phone records, or surveillance
camera footage) about all individuals in the vicinity of a crime—often
through “reverse search warrants” served on telecoms and other
companies, which may provide data on hundreds of devices.141 They then
systematically rule out suspects from this set to identify the perpetrator.
As Jane Bambauer notes, “This sort of [third-party] information could
give the police an initial suspect pool that could then be winnowed further
with the usual detective work.”142
In this context, Bob’s privacy depends on uncertainty, and it is only
possible to maintain the uncertainty upon which Bob’s privacy depends if

139. This hypothetical scenario draws from a real example. In 2013, a Harvard student made such
a threat. FBI agents were able to identify the student because, though the student had used Tor and an
anonymous email program to send the threat, he did so using Harvard’s wireless network. Though
agents could not tell from network logs precisely what the student was doing using Tor, they could
tell that he was one of a small set of students using Tor at the time of the threat, which led to his
detection. PJ Vogt, That Bomb-Hoaxing Harvard Student Was Using Tor, But They Caught Him
Anyway,
WNYC
(Dec.
18,
2013),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/harvard-bomb-threat/
[https://perma.cc/9YE4-E4JU].
140. MacCarthy describes another instance of this dependency in the hypothetical: “Suppose from
public data records, it can be inferred that one of two people was involved in a particular transaction
and that the person who engaged in the particular transaction was right-handed. If one of the two
people discloses that he is left-handed, he or she thereby discloses that the other person engaged in
the transaction.” MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 446.
141. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google is a Dragnet for the Police, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-locationtracking-police.html (calling these “geofence warrants”).
142. Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 234 (2015).
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certain details about others remain unknown. It may seem unintuitive to
think of Bob’s interest here as a privacy interest; after all, criminal
investigations often require winnowing a suspect pool in this way. But we
can just as easily imagine Bob being identified as a political dissident, or
whistleblower, or as a person accessing state-censored content, through
process of elimination. The point is that the mechanism of learning a
secret about Bob relies on the disclosure of Alice and the subsequent
deductive reasoning that her disclosure allows.
This situation has three necessary prerequisites.143 First, Alice and Bob
must belong to a closed set of potential targets.144 Second, the Observer
must be able to uniquely distinguish all members of the set, including Bob,
relative to one another.145 And finally, the Observer must be able to learn
exculpatory information about all Alices (that is, all members of the set
except Bob) in order to deduce that Bob is the culprit146 Pragmatically,
this implies that the set of potential targets is of relatively small size to
make such evidence-gathering manageable.
Efforts to protect privacy through anonymity generally take one of
three approaches to attenuate the conditions required for the Observer to
identify Bob—each oriented toward falsifying one of these prerequisites.
The first prerequisite—that the suspect set is closed—may be falsified by
creating uncertainty about the size of the suspect set. Doing so disrupts
the ability of the Observer to bound the number of possible suspects, such
that even exculpating everyone except Bob does not conclusively
implicate him. In the board game Clue, for example, players compete by
deducing, via process of elimination, which of six dinner guests at a
mysterious estate committed a murder; in every instance of gameplay, the
murder was committed by one of these six. But a key twist in the 1985
film adaptation of the board game is that one murder was committed by a
character outside the suspect set—Mr. Boddy, the owner of the estate,
who has been masquerading as the house’s butler.147 The source of
surprise for the film’s audience is the falsification of the first prerequisite:
that only members of the set might be the person of interest. Even reverse
search warrants premised on cell phone data are imperfect in this regard:
they may not capture data about all phones in an area, not to mention
potential suspects without cell phones.148
143. Id. at 207–8.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. CLUE (Paramount Pictures 1985).
148. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 141, (noting that even Google’s vast Sensorvault, used to
provide geofenced cell phone data to the police, doesn’t capture every phone); see also Jennifer
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These strategies respond to the fact that even when, for example,
activity on a network is anonymized, the use of that network can often be
more readily identified (as in the university bomb threat), giving the
Observer a finite number of possible suspects to consider.149 Certain
anonymity-preserving tools therefore aim to facilitate fully unobservable
communication such that, to the Observer, the user appears to be making
“regular [non-proscribed] network connections, while the user is actually
getting connected to destinations that are forbidden by that monitoring
entity.”150 In other words, the monitor cannot detect who is using an
anonymized network (and is therefore in the suspect set) in the first place,
and who is not.
Another approach is to falsify the second prerequisite by making set
members incapable of being uniquely identified relative to one another.
This is accomplished by creating plausible deniability for set members:
that is, making set members sufficiently indistinguishable from one
another such that no Observer could conclusively determine which one of
them committed an observed act, transmitted particular information, or
holds a particular identity. One method of doing so involves making
everyone in the suspect set look identical. For example, in the “I am
Spartacus” technique discussed by Brunton and Nissenbaum,151 multiple
members of the set claim the same identity to thwart distinguishability.
Alternatively, set members are not made to look identical, but their data
are “mixed up” such that it is hard to associate any behavior with a unique
Lynch, Google’s Sensorvault Can Tell Police Where You’ve Been, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/googles-sensorvault-can-tell-police-whereyouve-been [https://perma.cc/Q5YP-S678] (“[T]here’s a high probability the true perpetrator isn’t
even included in the data disclosed by Google. For these kinds of warrants, officers are just operating
off a hunch that the unknown suspect had a cellphone that generated location data collected by
Google. This shouldn’t be enough to support probable cause, because it’s just as likely that the suspect
wasn’t carrying an Android phone or using Google apps at the time.”).
149. See Vogt, supra note 139.
150. Amir Houmansadr et al., Cirripede: Circumvention Infrastructure Using Router Redirection
with Plausible Deniability, PROC. 18TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 187, 188
(2011). A recent Google policy change makes this more difficult by blocking “domain-fronting,” a
practice in which developers used Google as a proxy to avoid state censorship: “[a]s long as the
service was using domain-fronting, all the in-country data requests would appear as if they were
headed for Google.com, with encryption preventing censors from digging any deeper.” Russell
Brandom, A Google Update Just Created a Big Problem for Anti-Censorship Tools, VERGE (Apr. 18,
2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/18/17253784/google-domain-fronting-discontinuedsignal-tor-vpn [https://perma.cc/SLV4-PW85].
151. The example derives from the scene in the film Spartacus in which “the rebel slaves are asked
by Roman soldiers to identify their leader, whom the soldiers intend to crucify. As Spartacus . . . is
about to speak, one by one the others around him say ‘I am Spartacus!’ until the entire crowd is
claiming that identity.” FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR
PRIVACY AND PROTEST 15 (2015); see also Zbigniew Kwecka et al., “I am Spartacus”: Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, Collaborative Obfuscation and Privacy as a Public Good, 22 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 113, 115–16 (2014).
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identity. Obfuscation techniques like swapping loyalty cards to create
noise in data about shopping patterns decrease the degree to which
observations tied to a particular identifier can be tied to a unique
individual.152 Similarly, someone setting up a Tor exit node maintains
plausible deniability as to the transmission of illegal content through the
network, as Tor routes many individuals’ traffic through multiple servers,
making the transmission of any particular piece of information
unattributable to a specific person.153
A final strategy is to falsify the third prerequisite pragmatically, by
expanding the size of the suspect set to create “strength in numbers.”154
Anonymity-preserving networks are more effective at masking individual
behavior when they have many users, making identification of a particular
user more practically difficult. The effectiveness of this strategy depends
in part on the resources that the Observer brings to bear on the task of
identifying Bob. As Paul Syverson, one of Tor’s creators, noted, having
only “a few hundred concurrent users” on an anonymity network “is fine
if the goal is simply plausible deniability”—but inadequate for protection
against law enforcement or state intelligence, because “[i]f the adversary
has the incentives and resources of a nation-state or of organized
crime . . . the small anonymity set means that it is now within the resource
constraints of the adversary to closely scrutinize the online and offline
behavior of everyone identified as participating.”155 However, the size of
the set considered “manageable” to sift through has expanded
significantly thanks to automated analytic tools available to law
enforcement.156
One additional point is worth noting. Even when conclusive
identification of Bob is impossible—say, because the Observer cannot
obtain exculpatory information about each Alice, such that it cannot
winnow down the set of suspects to a single member—Bob can
nonetheless suffer a privacy harm. Say that the Observer knows initially
that one member of a set of ten committed a crime. Knowing nothing
152. BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 151, at 28–29.
153. See Tor Project: Overview, TOR, https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
[https://perma.cc/RH28-M8V7].
154. Cooper Quintin, Tor is for Everyone: Why You Should Use Tor, GIZMODO (Jun. 15, 2014),
https://gizmodo.com/tor-is-for-everyone-why-you-should-use-tor-1591191905
[https://perma.cc/UJL3-M68X].
155. Paul Syverson, Practical Vulnerabilities of the Tor Anonymity Network, in ADVANCES IN
CYBER SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY, OPERATION, AND EXPERIENCES 60, 65 (D. Frank Hsu & Dorothy
Marinucci eds., 2013).
156. Bambauer, supra note 142, at 210 (“Without computers, even the most legitimate searches
conducted with a warrant based on probable cause required police to tromp through houses, flip
through diaries, and sift through large amounts of personal information unrelated to the investigation.
Automated searches, by contrast, can tailor information access so that most irrelevant data is filtered
out.”).

04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES

6/6/20 1:12 PM

595

except the membership of the group, the Observer knows that Bob’s
likelihood of being the culprit is 10%. But as the Observer rules out Alices
from the denominator, Bob’s likelihood of being the person within the set
who committed the crime increases. Inference need not be definitive to
infringe upon privacy.157 Even if the Observer never identifies Bob, it may
deduce that Bob has a high likelihood of having committed the crime,
implicating Bob’s privacy and potentially leading to him being
treated differently.158
The use of process-of-elimination techniques can be controversial,
especially in law enforcement, because it requires engaging in the sort of
broad, unlimited “fishing expedition” that the Fourth Amendment is
specifically intended to proscribe. While no court rulings have yet
considered the validity of reverse search warrants, privacy advocates and
defense attorneys have begun to challenge their constitutionality.159
What’s more, the existence of process-of-elimination dependencies in
investigative contexts reveals a more general and fundamental truth about
the relational nature of anonymity. Anonymity is not a characteristic of an
individual, nor a result of individual actions that people take to make
themselves unidentifiable. Rather, only by preventing an Observer from
distinguishing Alice from Bob can Bob maintain some degree of
anonymity. What distinguishes us from others is what identifies us.
Anonymity, then, depends not only on what is known or unknown about
you—but also what is known or unknown about others. Anonymity
depends, therefore, on the actions of a collective; it cannot be
achieved alone.
The relational nature of anonymity has real consequences for policies
intended to protect us from being identified within a group. Laws and
policies commonly require that datasets be stripped of personally
157. Cf. MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 455 (noting probabilistic nature of information externalities
in data mining).
158. Arvind Narayanan, Joanna Huey, and Ed Felten articulate this principle in the closely related
context of dataset re-identification:
Suppose an analyst can narrow down the possibilities for Alice’s record in a de-identified
medical database to one of ten records. If all ten records show a diagnosis of liver cancer, the
analyst learns that Alice has liver cancer. If nine of the ten show liver cancer, then the analyst
can infer that there is a high likelihood of Alice having liver cancer. Either way, Alice’s privacy
has been impacted, even though no individual database record could be associated with her.
Arvind Narayanan et al., A Precautionary Approach to Big Data Privacy, in DATA PROTECTION ON
THE MOVE 357, 360 (2016); see also supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing inference
based on aggregate statistics).
159. See, e.g., Defendant Okello Chatrie’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from a
“Geofence” General Warrant at 1, United States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19-CR-00130-MHL (E.D. Va. Oct.
29, 2019) (moving to suppress evidence of geofence warrant used to obtain cell phone information
from all nineteen people in the vicinity of a bank robbery, on grounds of overbreadth and lack of
particularity); Lynch, supra note 148.

04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

596

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/6/20 1:12 PM

[Vol. 95:555

identifiable information (PII). Various laws set out to define the specific
pieces of information that count as PII,160 and to apply special privacy
rules when records contain PII.161 Historically, they have taken the
approach of trying to delineate, in advance, the discrete bits of information
that would make it possible to associate a record with the person whose
information has been captured in the record.162
But conceiving of PII as a fixed set of sensitive attributes (for example,
name, date of birth, etc.)—as these laws do—makes little sense when any
kind of information (for example, movie viewing habits, search queries,
etc.) might be uniquely identifying.163 What policies often overlook is that
information is or is not uniquely identifying only when juxtaposed against
information about others, regardless of how “sensitive” we might imagine
it to be. This insight has turned the notion of PII on its head. What is
personally identifiable is not an inherent property of certain pieces of
information; it is a function of how effectively any information
distinguishes people from one another. Information becomes personally
identifiable when it makes someone’s records different from everybody
else’s. A Social Security number, for example, is not identifying in its own
right; it is identifying only because no two people have the same number,
so it does the work of distinguishing people from one another.164 Should
there be a mistake and two people receive the same number, the number
would cease to be uniquely identifying. The relevant lesson is that unique
identifiers are necessarily relational: a piece of information about a
specific person is only unique—or not unique—when compared to what
is known about others.
Various strategies have been developed to deal with this problem.165
Differential privacy techniques respond to this concern by considering
identifiability as a quality of a dataset, rather than tying it to specific
identifiers.166

160. For example, HIPAA sets forth eighteen categories of identifiers that must be removed for a
dataset to be considered “de-identified” under the rule; these include attributes like names, email
addresses, account numbers, and fingerprints.
161. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2019).
162. Id.
163. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable
Information,” 53 COMM. ACM 24 (2010).
164. But see SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA
64–65 (2018) (discussing the early days of Social Security numbers when they were not unique).
165. AARON ROTH & MICHAEL KEARNS, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM (2019) (describing strategies
including suppressing certain fields, coarsening the values in each field (for example, move from birth
day to birth year), injecting noise into the records (swapping, controlled randomization, etc.), or only
reporting aggregate statistics).
166. See generally Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, 54 COMM. ACM
86 (2011) (describing the technical foundations of differential privacy).
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Anomaly Detection

In a related case, many individuals’ information is viewable to an
Observer, who aggregates the data into a central database. Individuals
may be required to render this information by law, or pressured to do so
by norm; whatever the cause, the result must be that the Observer has
access to data from many parties—including both Alice and Bob. In this
case, the Observer seeks to learn whose data are anomalous in the set, in
order to detect fraud, wrongdoing, or irregularity meriting investigation
or sanction.
Assume, here, that the Observer finds that Bob’s behavior is
anomalous. The Observer can only render this judgment by establishing
what normal behavior looks like and assessing abnormal behavior with
reference to that norm—a norm established by the aggregated data of
multiple Alices. The group of conforming Alices, and the provision of
their own data, are essential to constructing the comparison group that
defines Bob’s data as anomalous. This insight—that identifying deviation
from the norm depends, fundamentally, on first identifying the norm—
has both statistical and sociological roots. Statistical outliers are defined
by their distance from most other observations; the sociology of deviance
takes as one of its tenets the fact that “social groups create deviance by
making the rules [or norms] whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by
applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as
outsiders.”167
Crucially, in this case, the Observer already has Bob’s data—but
cannot make Bob’s data meaningful until they are placed in comparison
to others’ data. The data at issue may be a single outlying data point or an
unusual pattern of behavior, assessed by creating a model from Alice’s
data patterns. For instance, subpoenas are routinely issued for electricity
usage reports from utility companies; unusually high usage as compared
to usage by neighbors or by similarly-sized properties can provide
incriminating evidence of indoor marijuana grow operations.168 Bernie
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme was “made,” in part, because the returns on his
investments were consistently high in all sorts of conditions, in contrast
to the volatility that other investors experienced.169 Credit card fraud
167. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing whether
comparator houses for determining abnormal utility usage were sufficiently similar in size); United
States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no privacy expectation in utility
bills used for such purposes).
169. Con of the Century, ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2008), https://www.economist.com/node/12818310
[https://perma.cc/292G-9ER2]. Other quantitative indicators of hedge fund fraud include extremely
low correlation of returns with those of index funds, and serial correlation in returns over time (i.e.,
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detection also depends on spotting deviation from normal spending
behaviors, and increasingly uses machine learning methods to do so.170
There is one special case of anomaly detection worth noting. In most
scenarios, Bob’s data are anomalous because they are distinguishable
from the norm established by multiple Alices. Sometimes, however,
Bob’s data are anomalous because of their indistinguishability. Plagiarism
detection is the clearest example: Turnitin’s detection software compares
submitted assignments against a database of other submissions and
published works, and issues “similarity reports” to alert instructors if a
submission too closely resembles another in the set.171 This case might
appear to be the converse of the other instances described, as it is Bob’s
lack of uniqueness compared to Alices’ data that is the “tell”—but we can
understand it in similar terms. Here, the norm to which most Alices accord
is uniqueness, and Bob’s deviation from this norm leads to his detection.
No single Alice’s contribution to the dataset will “make” Bob in these
cases; rather, many Alices’ data are required to make Bob’s deviation
from the norm apparent. Initially, then, this may seem to be a fairly weak
form of dependency, as the responsibility for outing Bob is diffuse across
many Alices. But this diffusion has two important consequences for
privacy. First, it justifies dragnet surveillance by the Observer. Since
anomalies can only be detected with reference to norms, all Alices’ data
are required (or so the argument goes) to make meaning of Bob’s; an
enormous amount of data is collected based on the premise that it is
necessary for fraud detection. Former NSA head Keith Alexander
famously defended the agency’s bulk surveillance program on similar
grounds, claiming that “you need the haystack to find the needle.”172
Second, social considerations are unlikely to limit Alice’s disclosure:
Alice’s rendering of her own data likely engenders in her no sense of
responsibility for how it contributes to fingering Bob. (Who among us
feels that we have helped to call attention to a pot grower through our
electricity usage?) This limits the degree to which we can reasonably
abnormally “smooth” returns). In both cases, these results stand out because of their contrast with
“normal” behavior. Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, Suspicious Patterns in Hedge Fund
Returns and the Risk of Fraud, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2673, 2677–81 (2012).
170. See, e.g., Siddhartha Bhattacharyya et al., Data Mining for Credit Card Fraud: A Comparative
Study, 50 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS. 602 (2011). For a thorough overview of algorithmic methods
for anomaly detection across domain areas, see Varun Chandola et al., Anomaly Detection: A Survey,
41 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1 (Sept. 2009).
171. Similarity Reports: Interpreting a Similarity Report, TURNITIN, http://turnitin.com/selfservice/support-wizard.html#inst-similarity-two [https://perma.cc/8QMJ-WTDD].
172. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of Email Address Books Globally,
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collectsmillions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c67e6dd8d22d8f_story.html [https://perma.cc/4KYG-MHZF]. For discussion of the haystack metaphor
more generally and other instances of its use in surveillance contexts, see Sarah Logan, The Needle
and the Damage Done: Of Haystacks and Anxious Panopticons, 4 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (2017).
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expect Alices to mobilize toward protecting Bob’s privacy; if anything,
rules and norms counsel Alice to disclose.

3.

Adverse Inference

In anomaly detection, Bob’s deviation from Alices’ norm concerns
some characteristic of the data tendered by each—an outlying value, say,
or an atypical pattern—which arouses the Observer’s scrutiny of Bob. But
Bob may also deviate by failing to disclose information at all, in
contravention of Alices’ norm to disclose. If normal Alices tend to readily
disclose some piece of information to the Observer, and Bob takes some
privacy-protective measures to avoid doing so, Bob’s very act of
impeding the Observer’s view may provoke suspicion by being
definitionally abnormal. Alices’ decision to routinely disclose (or not to
routinely withhold) data about themselves can result in Bob’s
nondisclosure leading to an adverse inference against him, thus
implicating his privacy.
We often make inferences from atypical absences of information. If
most job applicants detail their employment histories on LinkedIn, not
having a profile is a red flag to potential employers;173 if your dating
profile lacks a photograph when most have one, prospective partners are
likely to infer that you must be unattractive.174 Nondisclosure is
understood by an Observer as a negative signal against the backdrop of
other people disclosing. Effectively, the source of the inference is a
version of the “nothing-to-hide” fallacy detailed by Daniel Solove: that
Bob’s unusual, privacy-protective concealment of information signals
that he must have some incriminating or undesirable attribute he wishes
to keep secret.175 This is akin to what Julian Sanchez has called the
redactor’s dilemma: the idea that taking uncommon pains to keep certain
bits of information hidden is itself an ironically communicative act.176 For
173. Allison Cheston, Recruiters Say: Avoid LinkedIn At Your Peril, FORBES (May 11, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/05/11/recruiters-say-avoid-linkedin-at-yourperil/#642d363021f6 [https://perma.cc/9V55-XEUZ] (quoting a staffing agency director saying that
“[i]f we are staffing for a recruiting or sales/marketing/business development role, then it is a big red
flag if a candidate has either no profile or a limited profile with a low number of connections”).
174. Cf. Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a FullDisclosure Future, 105 NW. L. REV. 1153, 1192 (2011) (making a similar observation in the context
of selling a car on eBay).
175. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY 22 (2011) [hereinafter SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE].
176. Julian Sanchez, The Redactor’s Dilemma, JULIAN SANCHEZ BLOG (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.juliansanchez.com/2009/12/08/the-redactors-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/6YLC-Z4XM].
Related phenomena include the negative signals communicated by Glomar responses and Fifth
Amendment invocations; though neither legally implicates the speaker for wrongdoing, the public
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example, satellite images may blur sensitive military compounds to
obscure them from view—which, should nothing else be blurred,
effectively calls attention to the location of said compounds.177 In many
cases, the mere use of an encryption or anonymization tool can create
suspicion of suspect behavior.178
Crucially, the fact that Bob’s behavior is unusual as compared to the
rest of the set—the Alices, who do not take similar privacy-protective
measures—makes it communicative. Were it to be common for the Alices
to protect their own privacy, it would alleviate the negative signal created
by Bob’s behavior. Whether or not Bob’s behavior is construed as
“hiding” depends on the “normal” behaviors of others in a given social
context.179 Wearing clothing at work isn’t construed as a concealment, but
wearing clothing on the beach might be. Closing the door to the bathroom
or having curtains on a house180 are common privacy-protective measures
that arouse no adverse inference because they are the norm; we interpret
these everyday concealments as polite measures that preserve dignity
and decorum.181

often perceives them as “saying something by not saying something.” Thanks to James Grimmelmann
for calling this example to our attention.
177. Matt Korda, Widespread Blurring of Satellite Images Reveals Secret Facilities, FED’N AM.
SCIENTISTS (Dec. 10, 2018), https://fas.org/blogs/security/2018/12/widespread-blurring-of-satelliteimages-reveals-secret-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/HVU5-K2XW]. Thanks to Arvind Narayanan for
calling this example to our attention.
178. For example, former CIA chief Mike Pompeo wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed in 2016
that “the use of strong encryption in personal communications may itself be a red flag” for terrorism.
Mike Pompeo & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Time for a Rigorous National Debate About Surveillance,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 3, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/time-for-a-rigorous-nationaldebate-about-surveillance-1451856106 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
179. Conversely, what behaviors we interpret as privacy-invasive are contingent on social norms.
The sociologist Erving Goffman coined the term “civil inattention” to refer to the collection of polite
behaviors—say, refraining from making sustained eye contact—that people tend to extend to one
another in public to maintain feelings of privacy in crowded spaces. ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS
IN PUBLIC 385 (1972).
180. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE, supra note 177, at 23.
181. Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 537 (2006) (“Today’s
norms and practices . . . call for the concealment of many aspects of the body, bodily functions, and
strong displays of emotion. We protect against the exposure of these bodily aspects because this
protection safeguards human dignity as defined by modern society . . . . The need for privacy, and
therefore the prevention of exposure, is created by the fact that we have social relationships and
concomitant norms of dignity and decorum.”).
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But unusual privacy-protective measures—like selective encryption of
files182 or avoiding contact with police183—may arouse suspicion
precisely because they violate perceived norms. As Elizabeth Joh has
noted, taking steps to evade surveillance (buying a burner phone, using
cash, blocking one’s face from cameras, and the like) can raise suspicion,
even when such actions are motivated by political or personal privacy
preferences, rather than wrongdoing. And they do so because of police’s
assumptions about which behaviors are commonplace and which are
not.184 As a result, innocent people are incentivized to alter their behavior
to avoid being seen as suspicious—since such labeling comes with social
costs, even without substantiated wrongdoing.185 This “tax” on innocent

182. For example, in United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), border agents in
Arizona inspected two laptops belonging to Cotterman, a registered sex offender, and found that
certain files on the laptops were password-protected; upon further examination, the agents found child
pornography, leading to Cotterman’s arrest. In determining whether the border agents had reasonable
suspicion to justify the search of Cotterman’s computers, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
existence of specific password-protected files was a factor supporting the reasonableness of the
search. Id. at 969. In so doing, the court grappled explicitly with how normal such a privacy-protective
measure is, noting that “[w]e are reluctant to place much weight on [the password-protection of the
files] because it is commonplace for business travelers, casual computer users, students and others to
password protect their files. Law enforcement ‘cannot rely solely on factors that would apply to many
law-abiding citizens,’ . . . and password-protection is ubiquitous.” Id. (emphasis added, internal
citation omitted). Moreover, password-protection of an entire device, rather than files within a device,
would not support a search, because device-level password-protection is an extremely common means
of ensuring security. Id. n.17. The court ultimately held that selective password-protection of files
could help support a border search when combined with other factors creating reasonable suspicion.
183. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). In Wardlow, police were deemed to have had
reasonable suspicion to stop an individual based on his “unprovoked flight upon noticing” them in a
high-crime area. Id. at 124. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[h]eadlong
flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is
certainly suggestive of such.” Id. In a partial dissent, Justice Stevens called attention to several
alternative rationales that would weaken the signal of suspicion conveyed by flight, noting that “[a]
pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons—to catch up with a friend a block or two
away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get
home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a
bully, or simply to answer the call of nature—any of which might coincide with the arrival of an
officer in the vicinity.” Id. at 128–29. He added that unprovoked flight from police “is neither
‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal’” for members of minority groups for whom contact with police may itself
be dangerous. Id. at 133.
184. Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1016–17 (2013) (“Because suspicious behavior is often unusual behavior,
police judgments about criminally suspicious behavior are necessarily hunches about abnormality,
regularity, and conformity.”).
185. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding
Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517 (2011). Atkinson points out that the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against only unreasonable searches incentivizes even law abiders to act non-suspiciously. Id. at 1520.
Because people have no legal recourse against a reasonable but erroneous search, they internalize the
private costs (hassle, loss of dignity, reputational harm, etc.) of the risks of being searched. Id. at
1543. Atkinson argues that this aspect of the Fourth Amendment channels law abiders to act in a way
that minimizes erroneous searches by making it easier for police to identify wrongdoers by their
suspicious activity. Id. at 1520. In other words, it incentivizes people to act “normally.”
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privacy-protective activity is imposed more heavily on groups that are
over-policed or otherwise subject to heightened suspicion.186 When
privacy-protective behavior intersects with constitutional rights—for
example, when the behavior consists of refusing a warrantless search of
one’s person or property—courts have struggled with the degree to which
such behavior can be interpreted as a signal of wrongdoing.187
The line between a negative signal and a social norm is a malleable
one. Should others begin to withhold information in the same manner as
Bob, the adverse inference created by Bob’s concealment is weakened.
This argument counsels in favor of understanding privacy as a collective
good that can be collectively protected. We previously discussed why
tactics like obfuscation and the use of anonymity networks attenuate the
conditions required for identifying Bob through process of elimination;188
at the same time, when these strategies become more common, they
normalize privacy-protective activity and weaken the signal of
wrongdoing that may be associated with it. As Bruce Schneier writes:
Encryption should be enabled for everything by default, not a
feature you turn on only if you’re doing something you consider
worth protecting . . . . If we only use encryption when we’re
working with important data, then encryption signals that data’s
importance. If only dissidents use encryption in a country, that
country’s authorities have an easy way of identifying them. But if
everyone uses it all of the time, encryption ceases to be a signal.
No one can distinguish simple chatting from deeply private
conversation. The government can’t tell the dissidents from the
rest of the population. Every time you use encryption, you’re
protecting someone who needs to use it to stay alive.189
186. Id. at 1524–25.
187. Generally, the invocation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights cannot be considered as
evidence of guilt, as doing so places “an unfair and impermissible burden” on the exercise of such
rights, robbing them of their meaning. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978).
However, some state statutes do allow a driver’s refusal to submit to blood and breath tests to be
considered as evidence of wrongdoing on the basis of implied consent laws that attach to operation
of a vehicle in those states. The tension between these evidentiary consequences and Fourth
Amendment protection is currently unresolved. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bell v.
Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __ (No. 19-622), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19622/122507/20191114190036011_No.__PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WTA8-J3K2] (seeking certiorari to determine evidentiary consequences of refusal
to submit to warrantless blood test). See generally Kylie Fisher, Save Your Breath: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Criminal Penalties for Refusing Breathalyzer Tests in the Wake of Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 94 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2019).
188. See supra section II.C.1.
189. Bruce Schneier, Why We Encrypt, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (June 23, 2015),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/06/why_we_encrypt.html [https://perma.cc/VL6ZC236]; see also Joh, supra note 169, at 1004 (describing everyday efforts to thwart surveillance as
being a form of “privacy protest” with social value); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy,
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673 (2016) (characterizing same as expressive acts of resistance).
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Making Bob’s privacy dependent on the collective action of many
Alices is a risky proposition, since—as we have described—Alice may be
disincentivized from taking privacy-protective steps herself. One of the
most powerful structural ways to normalize these steps is to obviate the
collective action problem through design defaults.190 Design defaults
effectively scrub privacy-protective behaviors of meaningful signals by
making such behaviors both widespread and deniable.191
The Observer can make adverse inferences from Bob’s nondisclosure
when “normal” Alices disclose. In addition, a special case of adverse
inference from nondisclosure, unraveling, emerges when Alice and Bob
are explicitly ranked against one another, competing for some service or
position. The logic that underlies unraveling is this:192 disclosure of some
type of information is officially voluntary, but the Observer attaches value
to disclosure with some incentive or benefit—say, a discount—if the
discloser has some desirable attribute. Assume that Alice initially
discloses some attribute that puts her in a good light, and that Bob has a
comparatively weaker value for that attribute. Upon Alice’s disclosure,
Bob can be affected in one of two ways. He might disclose, despite
preferring not to, in order to distinguish himself from even worse
performers. Or he might not disclose and, as a result, be subject to adverse
inference based on his nondisclosure. Though Bob technically has the
power to choose, his choice is illusory: whether or not he discloses,
Alice’s provision of information facilitates the Observer learning more
about Bob regardless of what Bob does, either explicitly, should Bob
disclose, or through adverse inference, should he withhold. The
mechanism that drives unraveling is the incentivized desire to distinguish
oneself from a group—specifically, to designate oneself as above average
on some dimension. But as more people disclose, the average of the
remaining non-disclosing pool shifts ever downward, until everyone has

190. Ironically, market dominance and service lock-in have fortunate side effects when their default
settings are privacy-protective. Dieter Bohn, Why I Turned On iMessage, VERGE (Jun. 13, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/13/18677644/imessage-iphone-apple-secure-encrypted-chatmoral-imperative-signal-rcs-hangouts [https://perma.cc/4KKT-PFXR] (noting the benefits of
iMessage being encrypted by default rather than trying to convince people to switch to a third-party
encrypted chat app).
191. Karen Levy & Bruce Schneier, Privacy Threats in Intimate Relationships, J. CYBERSECURITY
(forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors). Since many people never adjust privacy settings, making data
private by default increases the number of people using them, and also obviates the need for a person to
take affirmative steps to protect privacy, which can function as a “tell.”
192. The most thorough treatment of unraveling in the information privacy law context is Peppet,
supra note 174; see also MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 26–27 (summarizing adverse inferences to be
drawn from nondisclosure in eligibility decisions).
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either disclosed or is subject to inference that their value for the attribute
is of the lowest quality.193
To illustrate, imagine that a university that used to require standardized
test scores for admissions decisions opts to make such disclosure
voluntary.194 Alice, who has a very high score, will surely share this
information with the university. Bob, who has a somewhat lower but still
respectable score, will be incentivized to disclose as well, because he
wants to avoid being lumped in with the masses; he wants the Observer to
know that he is superior (along this dimension) to students with even
lower scores. If Bob refrains from sharing his score, the university may
infer that his nondisclosure masks poor performance: if he did well, why
not share? Bob’s disclosure has the same effect on someone with a
marginally lower score than Bob—and on down the line—such that in the
end, nearly everyone has disclosed, and those who haven’t are assumed to
be the worst of the lot.
The configuration shares some resemblance with identification through
process of elimination,195 in which Alice’s disclosure is also selfinterested. There, disclosure serves to exculpate Alice from culpability,
increasing Bob’s probability of being identified. Here, Alice’s disclosure
favorably differentiates her from the crowd—and in so doing, impugns
Bob if he does not also disclose. Both Alice’s and Bob’s disclosures are
purportedly individual and voluntary—but they really aren’t, precisely
because Alice and Bob are in competition with one another for some sort
of favorable treatment. Disclosure is a way to convince the observer that
“I am not like these other people; I am better than (at least some of) them,”
and its effect is to create social cleavage and undermine solidarity.196
As Scott Peppet describes, unraveling has limits: it only applies when
disclosure is low-cost and credible, and when no countervailing norms
militate against it.197 Legal constraints attempt to prevent unraveling in a
variety of ways. They may prohibit (even voluntary) disclosures, but
doing so is difficult to justify and often in conflict with First Amendment
interests—and self-interested actors can often make end-runs around such
rules though signaling in other ways.198 In the alternative, law might
193. See Peppet, supra note 174, at 1181.
194. See id. at 1196. In this hypothetical, the university has historical data about applicant scores, owing
to its recent policy change. In the absence of such data, the university would have to either ascribe some
central score to everyone in the pool or use readily available data as proxies. Id. at 1161.
195. See supra section II.C.1.
196. See Peppet, supra note 174, at 1202 (“The ability to disclose—even at the risk of unraveling
privacy—brings with it the ability to seek economic advantage. There are distributive stakes here.”).
197. See id. at 1190–96.
198. See id. at 1198–99. For a review of other disclosure and nondisclosure rules in law, see Adam
M. Samaha & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combinations, 103 CALIF. L.
REV. 919 (2015).
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prohibit the use of certain forms of data in making some decision, such
that disclosure ceases to accomplish its intended end. We apply such rules
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (which restricts the bases on which
creditors can deny credit) and in health care statutes that limit what data
insurers can use in setting premiums.199 But in many contexts, such
policies are likely to face opposition from those who would benefit from
disclosure, and as such it may be very difficult to mobilize political
support for them.
***
Each of the difference-based dependencies described in this section
implicates concerns about how we stand out from the crowd. There’s little
Bob can do to protect his privacy in these cases; in some cases, any
attempts he might make to do so may, perversely, make him stand out
even more. The collectivity is essential to privacy preservation here. But
it can be very difficult to muster collective will among many Alices to
help Bob achieve privacy, since they are likely either unaware of the
effects of their disclosures or acting out of requirement or self-interest.
Because many individuals’ data are required to pinpoint a suspect
through process of elimination, to identify anomalous data, or to make
meaning of abnormal nondisclosure, the Observer’s techniques tend
toward the mass collection of information via dragnets or strong
expectations of widespread disclosure (enforced through rule, norm, or
incentive). Given the difficulties of mobilizing collective action,
difference-based dependencies are best addressed through restrictions on
this mass collection—for example, prohibiting reverse search warrants,
barring institutions from using certain types of data in making decisions,
or leveraging design to impede the signals sent by proactive privacy
protection.

III. CASE STUDY: GENETIC DEPENDENCIES
We turn here to examination of a specific context in which multiple
forms of dependency are at work. We do this to demonstrate the value of
clarifying precisely what dependencies are at stake in a given situation,
and what technical and legal tools are available to protect the interests that
each implicates. Of late, and due in large part to the proliferation of
genealogical databases and DNA home-testing kits,200 legal scholars and
the public are becoming more attuned to the privacy implications of
199. See Peppet, supra note 174, at 1199–200 (discussing these and other examples, and also noting
the limitations of such policies).
200. See generally ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE GENOME (2016) (discussing the social ramifications of increased access
to genetic testing, particularly with respect to race).
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genetic data.201 Genetic information is widely seen as worthy of special
attention and protection. DNA has a set of qualities that give it particular
value for a wide range of investigative and predictive uses: it is uniquely
identifying; it demonstrates immutable relationships with others;202 and it
predicts propensities for future risks. These qualities also make it readily
exploitable for all three forms of dependency we identify: tie-based,
similarity-based, and difference-based. The genetic context presents a
telling example of how different configurations of privacy dependencies
can become entwined in practice, and the implications of those
entanglements for privacy regulation.

A.

Tie-Based

The 2018 capture of the Golden State Killer203 aroused public attention
about the forensic power of genetic data. A good deal of the investigation
of the Golden State Killer relied on tie-based dependencies—genetic
connections revealed in genealogy databases. The investigation initially
identified the great-great-great-grandparents of Joseph DeAngelo; from
there, investigators relied on detective work, constructing family trees
with thousands of relatives to develop a suspect set.204 As discussed in
section II.B, other forms of dependency were also exploited in the
investigation.205
More and more people are subject to identification based on familial
ties—without their own direct participation or opportunity to withhold
consent—as home genetic testing websites grow and as law enforcement
increasingly gains access to them. Researchers estimate that about 60% of
European-descended Americans can be genetically linked to at least a
third cousin through commercial DNA testing services to which law
enforcement has access, based on the fact that those databases currently
include samples from about 0.5% of the U.S. adult population.206 If the
201. See Jake Weidman et al., On Sharing Intentions, and Personal and Interdependent Privacy
Considerations for Genetic Data: A Vignette Study, 16 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY & BIOINFORMATICS 1 (2019) (examining what factors affect the
likelihood of sharing genetic data with different organizations).
202. Ram, supra note 77, at 877.
203. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
204. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His Great-GreatGreat Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-greatgrandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2020).
205. See infra section II.B.
206. Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial Searches,
362 SCIENCE 690 (2018); Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State
Killer Can Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM),
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participant figure rises to 2%, expected to occur within two to three years,
90% of the European-descended population of the United States will be
identifiable by a third cousin or closer.207 The disclosure decisions of the
few effectively determine the privacy outcomes for the many.
Several signs indicate that the exploitation of tie-based genetic
dependencies is poised to become even more widespread. Police have
begun using the technique more frequently, and to investigate less serious
crimes. In March of 2019, police in Utah cooperated with genealogy
database GEDmatch to identify a suspect in the assault of a church
organist. Despite GEDmatch’s terms of service specifying that it would
only cooperate with law enforcement for homicide and sexual assault
cases, it broke its own rules by pointing police to the seventeen-year-old
perpetrator’s great-uncle, whose DNA was in its database.208
Further, some genealogy companies have shown a marked change in
how they talk about the use of their databases for investigative purposes.
FamilyTreeDNA, which has a partnership with the FBI, implores
customers in a new ad campaign to help “provide the missing link”209
through DNA samples that could help solve violent crimes.
FamilyTreeDNA’s founder said the company had “a moral responsibility”
to help solve cold cases and bring families closure.210 The genomics
company Verogen, upon its purchase of GEDMatch, made a similar
appeal: “Never before have we as a society had the opportunity to serve
as a molecular eyewitness, enabling law enforcement to solve violent
crimes efficiently and with certainty.”211These claims do not, however,
specify the mechanism through which customers can (in

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-nab-golden-statekiller-can-home-about-60-white [https://perma.cc/ETF4-BVP4].
207. Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy
Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/sciencegenetic-genealogy-study.html [https://perma.cc/SDT2-YJW2].
208. Peter Aldhous, The Arrest of a Teen on an Assault Charge Has Sparked New Privacy Fears
About
DNA
Sleuthing,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(May
14,
2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-parabon-gedmatch-assault
[https://perma.cc/Q7SQ-R7BU].
209. Jennings Brown, Ancestry-Testing Company: It’s Our ‘Moral Responsibility’ to Give the FBI
Access to Your DNA, GIZMODO (Apr. 3, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://gizmodo.com/ancestry-testingcompany-it-s-our-moral-responsibilit-1833774781 [https://perma.cc/JN5F-23QL].
210. Id. At the same time, some companies have restricted law enforcement access in response to
privacy concerns. Kristen V. Brown, DNA Site that Helps Cold-Case Sleuths Curbs Access for Cops,
BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-10/dnasite-that-helps-cold-case-sleuths-curbs-access-for-police [https://perma.cc/636A-VMYU].
211. Julian Husbands, GEDMatch Partners with Genomics Firm, VEROGEN (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://verogen.com/gedmatch-partners-with-genomics-firm/ [https://perma.cc/K525-P4DU].
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FamilyTreeDNA’s words) “crowd-source crime solving”212—by
providing incriminating information about their own family members.

B.

Similarity-Based

Genetic information is often the basis for similarity-based dependency,
most commonly in the context of inferred characteristics based on genetic
markers. Even without understanding the biological pathways between
genes and propensities for disease, researchers can make inferences about
a person’s probability of developing various health conditions based on
their resemblance to others with similar genetic profiles. Pharmaceutical
giant GlaxoSmithKline recently purchased a $300 million stake in home
DNA testing company 23andMe that brings with it exclusive rights to use
23andMe’s trove of data to develop drug targets.213 In addition to having
customers’ genetic information, 23andMe sends regular surveys to its
customers to capture phenotypic and behavioral data,214 and runs a health
hub “where customers can share information about how they manage 18
common health conditions”—giving the company and its partners access
to self-reported information on condition prevalence and efficacy of
various treatments for people with known genetic profiles.215 Glaxo’s
hope is to generalize from 23andMe’s data by making inferences about
the predispositions and treatment responsiveness of potential customers
who don’t have 23andMe profiles, but share genetic patterns with those
on the platform.
Notably, disease risk scoring using genetic data is far more accurate for
European-descended individuals than for those with African, Latino, or
Asian ancestries—a consequence of the Eurocentric composition of
individuals who have participated in scientific genome studies. This
underrepresentation—which has been called “the major ethical and
scientific challenge surrounding clinical translation and, at present, the
most critical limitation to genetics in precision medicine”216—stands in

212. Brown, supra note 210.
213. Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED (Aug. 3,
2018,
3:28
PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/
[https://perma.cc/NBD8-6SMP].
214. Id.
215. Megan Molteni, 23andMe Wants You to Share Even More Health Data, WIRED (Apr. 20,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-wants-you-to-share-even-more-health-data/
[https://perma.cc/8XUG-RQP9].
216. Alicia R. Martin et al., Clinical Use of Current Polygenic Risk Scores May Exacerbate Health
Disparities, 51 NATURE GENETICS 584, 584 (2019).
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stark contrast to the overrepresentation of those groups in DNA databases
used for criminal investigation.217
Insurers may also be interested in making inferences about a person’s
future health based on genetic profiles.218 The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) bans health insurers from using genetic
information about an individual or that individual’s family members to
make coverage determinations or set premiums—but long-term care
insurers, disability insurers, and life insurers are not restricted from doing
so.219 The life insurer YouSurance, for example, uses epigenetic data—
information about gene expression modified by influences from the
environment and behaviors—to set differential rates for its policies.220 As
scientific understanding of genes and their expression continues to
progress—and as more people participate in scientific studies and
exchange information on their health conditions on 23andMe—the basis
for genetic inference and the predictive power of these data will only
grow.
Similarity-based dependencies that rely on phenotype are also
implicated in some criminal investigations. Forensic DNA phenotyping is
used to predict the physical traits of an unknown person who has left a
DNA sample at a crime scene, based on probabilistic associations with
traits in other people with similar DNA profiles. The technique can be
used to predict traits like hair color, skin color, eye color, freckling, height,
baldness, and earlobe attachment.221 In several cold cases, law
enforcement agencies have released DNA phenotype composite images
in hopes of identifying a suspect.222 Sometimes, dependencies are utilized
in tandem: in the Golden State Killer case, after several men were
identified as persons of interest based on familial matching and
circumstantial evidence (like residency in California during the time of
the murders), genetic genealogists used health risk and eye color analysis
websites to determine that people with the genetic profile of the unknown
217. Erin Murphy & Jun Tong, The Racial Composition of Forensic DNA Databases, 108 CALIF.
L. REV. (2020) (forthcoming).
218. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text.
219. Michelle Andrews, Genetic Tests Can Hurt Your Chances of Getting Some Types of
Insurance, NPR (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/08/07/636026264/genetic-tests-can-hurt-your-chances-of-getting-some-types-ofinsurance [https://perma.cc/QFH8-MERL].
220. YOUSURANCE, https://www.yousurance.com/science/ [https://perma.cc/4F9U-W6GP].
221. See Charles E. MacLean & Adam Lamparello, Forensic DNA Phenotyping in Criminal
Investigations and Criminal Courts: Assessing and Mitigating the Dilemmas Inherent in the Science,
8 RECENT ADVANCES IN DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 104, 104 (2014).
222. See, e.g., Sean Alloca, First DNA-Phenotyped Image of ‘Person of Interest’ in Double
Homicide, FORENSIC MAG., Jan. 15, 2015 (describing release of phenotype composite image in search
for suspect in South Carolina homicide).

04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

610

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/6/20 1:12 PM

[Vol. 95:555

sample were likely to have blue eyes and to bald prematurely. Only one
of the identified suspects from that set—Joseph DeAngelo—had those
characteristics.223

C.

Difference-Based

Genetic data can also be the basis of the third type of privacy
dependency, based on difference between people. As discussed, genetic
data is commonly used as a way to identify an unknown person—for
instance, by matching a DNA sample from a crime scene with information
from genetic profiles of known individuals (e.g., against a database of
samples held by law enforcement or a genetic testing company). In other
cases, though, investigators might try to collect DNA samples from all
members of a circumscribed set of suspects, on the belief that testing an
unidentified sample from a crime scene against these newly collected
samples will either identify the culprit or rule out the innocent. These
cases meet the conditions in which process of elimination dependencies
can arise:224 there is an (assumed) finite set of individuals who may have
committed the offense, the individuals are genetically distinguishable as
to one another, and the suspect set is not so large as to make bulk
collection pragmatically impossible. When these conditions are met,
genetic data can be used to identify Bob—who may not tender a sample—
because innocent Alices submit their own, winnowing down the suspect
set. Unlike the tie-based genetic dependencies in familial searches of
existing genetic databases, collecting new DNA samples creates a
difference-based genetic dependency.
Dragnet DNA sweeps involve the mass collection of genetic samples
for purposes of identifying a suspect. The technique is often used in cases
in which the suspected perpetrator of some wrong is assumed to be one of
a manageably sized finite set.225 The collection may be premised on rule
or on norm. In the former case, a search warrant or organizational rule
may mandate the mass collection of samples. For example, in 2018, a
woman in an Arizona long-term care facility who had been severely
incapacitated for a decade gave birth to a baby, leading to a strong
presumption that she had been sexually assaulted by a caretaker during
that period. Police served a search warrant on the facility seeking DNA
223. Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What She’s Going
to Do Next., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/barbara-raeventer-gsk.html [https://perma.cc/E62D-3MGS].
224. See supra section II.C.1.
225. David M. Halbfinger, Police Dragnets For DNA Tests Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4,
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/04/us/police-dragnets-for-dna-tests-draw-criticism.html
[https://perma.cc/79YS-D9NS] (describing several DNA dragnets used by law enforcement, and
noting that such mass screenings have been more successful “when the police have narrowed their
focus to smaller groups”).
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samples from all its male employees226—under the assumption that one
of them was very likely to have raped the woman—in order to determine
whose DNA matched that of the baby.227
In other cases, individuals may be coerced into giving samples based
on a desire to self-exculpate, a belief that they have no right to refuse, or
based on some more generalized sense of civic duty—knowing that by
tendering their own DNA, they are not only reducing the size of the
candidate pool, but are also helping to create a norm toward disclosure,
the violation of which will create adverse inference against the noncompliant.228 In a 2003 case, for example, police asked 800 Louisiana men
for DNA to be matched against unidentified murder scene samples; one
man (who was not implicated in the killings) was told by police that
submitting to a cheek swab “was his choice . . . but if he refused, [the
police] would get a court order that would get in the newspapers and then
everyone would know he was not cooperating.”229 In a similar
Massachusetts sweep in 2005 in which all adult males in a town were
asked to submit DNA, one man who volunteered his sample said he did
so because “[i]f it gives them one less suspect, that’s fine by me . . . . I
don’t have anything to hide.”230 Similar norms were invoked in response
to a 2004 Oklahoma dragnet: police announced that failure to cooperate
by voluntarily submitting a sample “leaves an open end out there for us to
look at.”231
In practice, these investigations often implicate multiple privacy
dependencies. An investigation of the 1998 murder of an eleven-year-old
boy in the Netherlands, for example, relied on a combination of familial
matching and adverse inference by nondisclosure: in seeking to identify
DNA found on the victim’s clothing, prosecutors sought voluntary
collection from over 20,000 Dutchmen based on familial matching, as
226. DNA Samples Sought at Facility Where Woman in Vegetative State Gave Birth, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dna-samples-sought-at-facility-where-woman-invegetative-state-gave-birth/ [https://perma.cc/Z3U3-NZKU].
227. This case is unusual in that investigators’ search is premised not on a DNA sample from the
culprit himself, only the baby with whom he must have a partial genetic match. In this sense, the
investigative strategy is also taking advantage of tie-based genetic dependencies.
228. For discussion of potential Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to “voluntary” DNA
dragnets, see Lauren Kirchner, DNA Dragnet: In Some Cities, Police Go From Stop-and-Frisk to
Stop-and-Spit, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/dna-dragnet-insome-cities-police-go-from-stop-and-frisk-to-stop-and-spit [https://perma.cc/J6XT-LWWG].
229. Halbfinger, supra note 225.
230. Jonathan Finer, Baffled Police Try DNA Sweep, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2097-2005Jan11.html [https://perma.cc/KVB59XND].
231. Rebecca
Leung,
DNA
Dragnet,
CBS
NEWS
(Sept.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dna-dragnet/ [https://perma.cc/7FVG-MLPL].

10,

2004),
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well as mandatory collection from 1,500 men “of special interest” in the
case.232 In the end, a match was located based on a combination of
strategies: when one man failed to submit an obligatory sample and could
not be located by police, police took DNA samples from his family
members, which matched the crime scene DNA.233 And even when only
one dependency is exploited for a particular case, samples may be
retained for use in other cases in which other dependencies are at play.
For instance, after police knocked on the doors of over 500 residents of
East New York, asking them to submit “voluntary” cheek swabs to
eliminate them from the suspect pool for a nearby murder, the DNA of
even those exculpated in the current investigation was retained for future
investigations, including familial matching.234

D.

The Law of Genetic Dependencies

Consider, then, the variety of ways privacy dependencies attach to the
use of genetic data. All three types of dependency have been harnessed in
criminal investigations—and often in combination with one another,
exploiting the capabilities of each. As we shall see, all three types are
surprisingly implicated by employment nondiscrimination law as well.
In 2015, supervisors in an Atlanta grocery warehouse were frustrated
by repeatedly finding piles of human feces on the floor of their facility.
The supervisors made a list of potential suspects in an attempt to pinpoint
the “devious defecator,”235 based on which of their employees’ work
schedules seemed to align with the timing and location of the offenses;
they then asked two employees from that list, whom they suspected of
having left the piles, to give DNA samples to be matched against the
feces.236 The workers gave the samples, saying they feared for their jobs
should they refuse. As it turned out, neither was a match. They
subsequently sued their employer under the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).237

232. Milan Schreuer, 17,500 Dutchmen Gave Their DNA in a Murder Inquiry. After 20 Years, an
Arrest., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/world/europe/
netherlands-murder-dna.html [https://perma.cc/4MJN-TUXP].
233. Id.
234. Allison Lewis, The NYPD’s New DNA Dragnet: The Department is Collecting and Storing
Genetic Information, With Virtually No Rules to Curb Their Use, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019,
6:52 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-the-nypds-new-dna-dragnet-20190206story.htm [https://perma.cc/5SQY-SCNF].
235. The case, Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (N.D. Ga.
2015), soon became colloquially known by this name in the popular press.
236. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1360.
237. Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1361.
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GINA is meant to address the risks of health insurers and employers
discriminating against people on the basis of genetic tests238 and family
medical history.239 Privacy is conceptualized in the law not as an end in
itself,240 but as a “bulwark [to prevent] access to the very information
health insurers or employers could use to discriminate.”241 The core
concern to which the law is addressed is the worry that health insurers
might raise premiums or drop coverage based on health risks revealed by
genetic data; the law’s application to employers is premised on the
connection between employment and health insurance cost.242 GINA
addresses these risks by preventing health insurers from making eligibility
or premium determinations on the basis of genetic information;243 by
making it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of genetic
information; and by making it unlawful for an employer to request or
require information from an employee or an employee’s family member.
In other words, GINA was initially devised as an intervention on two
types of dependency. It addresses similarity-based dependencies because
genetic information may allow for inference based on the predispositions
and health outcomes of known individuals with comparable profiles. And
it speaks to tie-based dependencies because information about the genetic
profiles and manifested health conditions of family members may be used
to learn more about the employee—for example, the risk of hereditary
diseases. In both cases, the goal of the statute is to guard against
discrimination on the basis of genetic conditions or predispositions.
Yet in the devious defecator case, the plaintiffs made a different
argument about GINA’s protections. In their case, the dependency at stake
was not based on similarity or tie but was a difference-based dependency.
By drawing up a list of suspected defecators based on work schedules—
and then winnowing the list by asking employees to provide DNA
samples to exclude themselves from suspicion—the company sought to
use employees’ DNA for identification, rather than for discrimination
238. By its terms, GINA offers protection for a person’s own genetic tests and the genetic tests of
her family members. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018).
239. In addition to a family member’s genetic tests, GINA offers protection against discrimination
on the basis of the manifested health conditions of a person’s family members, including dependents
and relatives up to four degrees away. Id. GINA does not provide a cause of action for disparate
impact discrimination based on genetic information, in contrast of other civil rights statutes. See
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75 (2016) (arguing for
the authorization of a disparate impact cause of action).
240. Bradeley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 711, 715 (2019).
241. Id. at 718.
242. Id. at 723–24.
243. Note that this component of GINA is an example of a “don’t use” restriction, as discussed in
Peppet, supra note 174, at 1200 et seq.
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based on the medical information it contained. The crux of the case came
down to the court’s analysis of whether GINA should be interpreted to
protect workers against this sort of use. The warehouse company argued
that the statute should be interpreted only to bar employers from using
information related to an individual’s propensity for disease.244 Yet the
plain meaning of the statute, as the employees argued, prohibits employers
from “request[ing], requir[ing], or purchas[ing] genetic information with
respect to any individual prior to such individual’s enrollment under the
plan or coverage in connection with such enrollment,”245 save for certain
inapplicable exceptions. The jury agreed with this broader interpretation
and awarded the employees $2.2 million in damages.246
Our taxonomy of the relevant privacy dependencies explains why many
were surprised by the case’s outcome. Despite the court’s statutory
construction legitimating the plaintiffs’ claims, it seems quite clear that
GINA was conceptualized as a route to protect against similarity- and tiebased dependency. In response to the ruling, biotechnology law expert
John Conley opined that “[t]his is an application of the law that no one
thought of in a million years . . . . But the ruling is not controversial. You
can’t use genetic testing for dismissal purposes.”247
The court’s application of GINA to a difference-based dependency
does more than nominally augment the statute’s purview; it suggests that
the law might protect a wholly different and more expansive set of
normative values than those initially conceived. Though the law on its
face (and by its title) is addressed to concerns about discriminatory
treatment in rate-setting and to prediction based on genetic data248—both
forward-looking uses involving actuarial assessment about what an
employee will do (and cost) in the future—the devious defecator case has
nothing to do with discrimination or prediction. Instead, it suggests that
employers may not use employees’ DNA for forensic investigation about
past events, or for the purposes of identifying and disciplining employees
for such ostensible misbehavior. This use transforms GINA from a

244. Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1365.
245. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018).
246. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 240, at 752.
247. Ajunwa, supra note 239, at 113 (quoting Natasha Gilbert, Why the ‘Devious Defecator’ Case
is a Landmark for US Genetic-Privacy Law, NATURE (June 25, 2015),
http://www.nature.com/news/why-the-devious-defecator-case-is-a-landmark-for-us-genetic-privacylaw-1.17857 [https://perma.cc/42MZ-2DP2]).
248. It is worth noting that GINA’s success as a nondiscrimination statute is equivocal. Areheart
and Roberts’s empirical survey of cases brought under GINA demonstrated that no successful GINA
claims have been premised on discrimination based on the results of genetic tests. Areheart & Roberts,
supra note 240, at 714.
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relatively narrow risk allocation statute to a “robust protection for
employee privacy.”249

IV. CONCLUSION
Unpacking the disparate mechanisms that create different privacy
dependencies can give us the necessary clarity for policymaking and
regulation. Most immediately, it can help us determine if and when we
even recognize Bob as a party with a legitimate privacy claim when Alice
is the disclosing or observed party. It can shed light on the varied
normative goals that we expect privacy to serve under different
configurations. Finally, attending to the specific relationships that create
privacy dependencies can suggest possible targets for intervention—
opportunities to capitalize on mutual dependency or ensure greater
independence.
Certain forms of dependency afford greater opportunity for social
solidarities to develop than others do. If people are made aware of how
their disclosures may implicate close social ties, they may refrain from
making such disclosures. Inference on the basis of socially salient
characteristics, particularly those protected by discrimination law, might
be countered by activism and advocacy. People wishing to preserve
anonymity within a group might rely on collective action to make
themselves less readily distinguishable. But other dependencies make
privacy-protective solidarity less likely, like inference on the basis of nonsocially-salient characteristics and disclosures that involve distinguishing
oneself from a group for favorable treatment.
Privacy dependencies should thus not only call into question notice and
choice as a model for privacy regulation; they should force us to abandon
the naïve hope that solidarity can help rescue informed consent by
clarifying the degree to which our privacy choices implicate others. If we
are scarcely able to make decisions that attend to our own privacy
interests, the goal of recognizing shared interests should not be to further
burden our individual choices with an expectation that we take into
account the interests of others.250 At its best, solidarity can foster
collective action demanding technologies, policies, and laws that address
the mechanisms that create dependencies, relieving individuals of the
249. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 240, at 752. Areheart and Roberts go on to note that the
devious defecator case clarifies the “independent moral value” of workplace privacy as an intrinsic
harm, analytically separable from the extrinsic harm of potential discrimination based on private
information. Id. at 779–80.
250. Contra Carissa Véliz, Privacy is a Collective Concern, NEW STATESMAN (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/privacy/2019/10/privacy-collective-concern
[https://perma.cc/PGS2-FZJS] (arguing that dependencies make people morally responsible for one
another’s privacy).
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impossible task of managing collective interests through their individual
decisions. Recognizing the mechanisms that create different forms of
dependency does more than demonstrate the shortcomings of privacy
individualism; it lays the groundwork for well-tailored policymaking and
advocacy.

